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TOP SECRET

Talepunkter til udenrigsministerens  
samtale med udenrigsminister Genscher  
den 12. november 1979.

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TNF-modernization/  
arms control.  
HBMK.

I am very glad to have this opportunity to discuss with you, Mr. Genscher, the very important question concerning a modernization of NATO's Longer Range Theater Nuclear Forces.

I am well aware of the intensive and serious discussions that you have had in this country about the matter. As I see it, you have on the one side felt the necessity to improve NATO's TNF capability to secure NATO's defence, and on the other side been very careful that such a modernization would not inflict upon your relations with the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries. Shortly put, I think we view the situation in a very similar way. This is also why we strongly supported your proposal in April this year to establish The Special Group to consider seriously how to introduce the arms control element in the matter.

Your public debate on the matter already begun a long time ago. In Denmark it has only started a short while ago in the press and has now also been raised in the Danish Parliament, where the Radical Liberals, who are against the TNF-modernization, have asked for a debate which will take place on November 27.

The Government is now in the process of preparing itself for this debate and for a subsequent discussion and decision in time before the NATO-meeting on December 12.

As we approach the matter today it seems that we will be able to support a modernization decision based on the following assumptions:

that countries in which the new weapons are going to be stationed will be in a position to approve of the modernization proposal,

that a modernization decision will be followed by a concrete arms control proposal, and

that the traditional Danish policy of not accepting nuclear arms on Danish territory under present circumstances will continue to be respected.

As the picture presents itself it seems as if these assumptions more or less will be fulfilled. We find, however, that the arms control proposal before us is not specific enough why we have taken this matter up in NATO in two respects:

First: It must be made clear that the TNF arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union shall be initiated immediately after the decision to modernize NATO's TNF - also in the situation where SALT II has not been ratified.

Secondly: Substantial results stemming from arms control negotiations on TNF should lead to a reduction, adjusted to the negotiated result, in the number of the new TNF weapons, the deployment of which is envisaged to begin a couple of years from now (the proposal as of now is in our view too weak on this point).

In the discussion in NATO last week we made these two points clear and had them accepted by the American government for consideration. A final discussion hereof will take place at another NATO meeting on November 28, where I hope that your government will be able to support these views.

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