

DEN DANSKE REPRÆSENTATION
VED DET NORDATLANTISKE RÅD

DELEGATION DE DANEMARK
OTAN-NATO
BRUXELLES

Udenrigsministeriet.

Forsvarsministeriet.

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P. A. V.

K. Hannested
K. Hannested

Speaking Note on TNF for Permreps'
meeting on 28 November

1. Once again I should like to welcome Mr Aaron to our meeting. I have listened with interest to his statement. What he had to say is very much in line with the views of my own authorities.

2. We remain convinced of the need to take positive decisions in December both on LPTNF modernisation and on proposals for TNF arms control. We regard it as of the highest priority that these decisions should be taken in parallel so that the production and in due course deployment of the new systems can go ahead without delay and that we can, alongside this, engage the Soviet Union in serious arms control negotiations.

3. We do not believe such negotiations will be productive unless the Alliance has first demonstrated its resolve to maintain adequate theatre nuclear forces of its own. All our experience has shown that the Russians are only likely to negotiate seriously if they are faced with evidence of real determination

on the part of the Alliance. From this we draw the firm conclusion that NATO must decide on its modernisation programme and how it is to be achieved before we attempt to bargain about limitations. If we do not do this what are we going to bargain with?

4. I have listened with interest to what the Danish representative has said today. My authorities are concerned at the ideas which are being discussed for delaying decisions. We believe the suggestion in other quarters that we should decide in December only to go ahead with limited production, leaving a decision on deployment until later, would be wholly ineffective. It would not provide the evidence of determination which is needed if we are to get the Russians to negotiate seriously about limitations. Indeed it would give them ample scope for dragging out the negotiations with the object of deferring NATO decisions about deployment. Meanwhile they would be able to continue their own build-up. So the imbalance would be increased.

5. We are equally concerned about the proposal of the Danish Government that decisions on both production and deployment should be deferred for six months in

return for a freeze on Soviet deployments at their current levels. I have to say frankly that we regard this not only as impractical but also as having major disadvantages for the Alliance in military, political and arms control terms.

6. To put off decisions now for six months would cast doubt on the Alliance's ability to take difficult decisions. It would give the impression that we were not prepared to meet the military targets which we have set ourselves and which have already been so much publicised. And our failure to do this would be widely interpreted as being the result of Soviet pressure and propaganda. This could seriously undermine NATO's credibility. It would show a lack of confidence in ourselves which would bode ill for the future cohesion of the Alliance.

7. We also believe that postponement would damage the prospects for arms control. What would be the effect on the SALT II ratification debate? At the least it would introduce a new element of uncertainty into the situation. Indecision at this stage would

be interpreted by many people in the United States as showing that European members of the Alliance were reluctant to take the measures necessary for their defence. This could only be harmful to relations within the Alliance.

8. But more than this, we would lose the opportunity - to which I referred in my remarks on 6 November - to seize the initiative in the field of arms control by putting forward a number of measures which, taken together, would add up to a significant package in parallel with the modernisation decision. It would presumably no longer be possible to go ahead with the proposal for withdrawing warheads from the stockpile in Europe. And the context in which we were considering new initiatives in MBFR would be radically changed. In the new situation we should have to re-examine the basis for current proposals for simplified Phase I. And there is no doubt that the impact of any proposals on which we were able to agree would be much reduced.

9. In any case, we see little possibility within six months of achieving any positive results on TNF

arms control. Even if we could achieve a freeze, the Alliance would be frozen in its existing position of inferiority. That would be the basis on which we should have to embark on arms control negotiations and it is not in our view a satisfactory basis for securing Soviet agreement to limitation or reductions. Moreover what assurance would we have that a freeze would be observed by the Russians? As I understand it, the proposal is that it would be based on a unilateral Soviet declaration. It is not clear to us at what point within the proposed six month period the Russians would be expected to give any such commitment. But in any case is it suggested that we should attempt to negotiate verification measures and an agreed data base before it starts? There would be little value in a Soviet commitment to a freeze without agreement on these two points. But - having in mind the experience of SALT II and MBFR - can we contemplate that agreement on these points alone would be reached even within the period of six months?

10. My authorities remain convinced that there can be no satisfactory substitute for parallel decisions in December on TNF modernisation and arms control. They consider the revised version of the IDD provides a suitable basis for such decisions.