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TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BREZHNEV

TO PRIME MINISTER ANKER JØRGENSEN

(Unofficial translation)

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I am sending you this letter with the view of drawing your attention to the questions of military détente and limitation of the arms race in Europe. I would like to summarize briefly the essence of our thoughts and proposals on these questions which were laid down in my speech in Berlin.

First. The allegations disseminated in the West to the effect that the Soviet Union is building up its military potential on the European continent to the degree above defence needs have nothing to do with reality. One cannot evaluate them in any other way but as those called to serve as a cover for the development, adoption and implementation of plans to deploy new types of US nuclear missile weapons in Europe. In other words, to upset the balance of forces that has evolved in Europe and to try to secure military superiority for the NATO Block.

It could be said beforehand that hardly anything would come of such attempts. The Soviet Union and its allies would in that case have to take the necessary additional steps to strengthen their security. We have no other alternative.

It is quite clear, however, that if the NATO countries implement the said plans, it would inevitably result in an aggravation of the situation in Europe and would much envenom the international climate as a whole.

I would like to express the hope, Mr. Prime Minister, that your Government and you personally will study over and over again all aspects of this problem and consider thoroughly the consequences in case of stationing on the territory of your country of new types of American nuclear missiles aimed against the Soviet Union and its allies.

As to the Soviet Union, I have more than once stated and would like to repeat it to you personally: We do not seek military superiority, we have not threatened and do not intend to threaten anyone, our strategic doctrine has a strictly defensive nature.

I also confirm again that the Soviet Union would never use nuclear arms against those states that renounce the production and acquisition of such arms and do not have them on their territory.

Second. As I stated most definitely in Berlin, over the past ten years the number of medium-range carriers of nuclear arms on the territory of the European part of the Soviet Union has not been increased by as much as a single missile or a single aircraft. On the contrary, the number of medium-range missile launchers, as well as the yield of nuclear charges of these missiles have even decreased. The number of medium-range bombers has also been decreased here. In addition, the Soviet Union deploys no such weapons in other countries at all. For a number of years now we have not increased the number of our troops stationed in Central Europe. Such are the irrefutable facts, Mr. Prime Minister, and I am sure that they are fully known to the respective authorities in your country.

Moreover, we express our readiness to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear means deployed in the western areas of the Soviet Union compared to the present number, but, of course, only if no additional medium-range nuclear means are deployed in Western Europe.

As is known, important talks on SALT III are lying ahead. We are for commencing them immediately after the entry into force of the SALT II Treaty. Within the frame-work of these talks we agree to discuss the possibilities of limiting not only intercontinental but also other types of armaments, of course with due account taken of all related factors and with strict observance of the principle of equal security of the sides.

Third. Motivated by a sincere desire to overcome the impasse in the efforts of many years to achieve military détente in Europe and to show a good example of transition from words to real deeds, the Soviet Union, in agreement with the leadership of the GDR and after consultations with the other member states of the Warsaw Pact, has taken a decision to reduce

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unilaterally the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe. In the course of the next 12 months up to 20.000 Soviet Servicemen will be withdrawn from the territory of the GDR together with 1.000 tanks and also a certain amount of other military equipment.

We hope that this new and concrete proof of peaceful intentions and goodwill of the Soviet Union and its allies will be duly appreciated by the Governments of the NATO countries and that they will follow our example.

Fourth. Being supporters of a further strengthening of confidence-building measures among the states, we are, inter alia, ready to enter into agreement that the clause contained in the Final Act from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe on the advance notifications of large scale military manoeuvres of land forces should be made not at a three-week period, but at a month period and starting not from the present level of 25.000 men, but from a lower one, f. inst. from the level of 20.000 men. We are also ready on the basis of reciprocity to refrain from military manoeuvres involving more than 40.000-50.000 men. Besides, we propose to notify well in advance not only military exercises, but also movements of land forces in excess of 20.000 men in the area which is defined in the Helsinki Final Act. I would think, Mr. Prime Minister, that the specific contents of these new initiatives taken by the Soviet Union in agreement with the other member states of the Warsaw Pact speak for themselves. I would stress only one thing: Each of them is dictated by our desire to consolidate peace and security in Europe by complementing political détente by measures in the military field, including measures of real reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

Of course, other proposals put forward by member states of the Warsaw Pact - f. inst. on the conclusion among all the participants of the European Conference on Security and Co-operation of a treaty not to be the first to use nuclear weapons or conventional weapons against each other; on non-increase of military and political groupings in Europe; on notification of large air and naval manoeuvres held near the territorial waters of other states-participants of the European Conference; on extending confidence-building measures to the area of the Mediterranean - are still valid.

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On our part, we shall be ready to examine other proposals aimed at strengthening trust among the states and reducing the danger of war in Europe.

Such are the considerations on questions of military détente and limitations of armaments in Europe which my Colleagues and I wished to bring to your knowledge, Mr. Prime Minister.

I shall be glad to receive, as early as possible, your reply to the questions raised by me.

With respect,

L. Brezhnev

October 11, 1979.