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~~UNITED STATES PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE~~
~~NATO SECRET~~
ON THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Brussels

105-10000

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DATE	11/07/1979
BY	710041379
REVISIONS	105-10000

November 6, 1979

NATO SECRET

Dear Joseph:

105-10000

Enclosed is a copy of the text of the remarks delivered by Mr. David Aaron at the meeting of Permreps on 6 November.

I am sending copies of this letter and the enclosed remarks to other concerned Permanent Representatives.

Yours very sincerely,

Tap

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.
Ambassador

His Excellency
Joseph M.A.H. Luns,
Secretary General,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Brussels.

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NATO SECRET

PRESENTATION TO THE NATO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES

BY DAVID AARON, 6 NOVEMBER 1979

MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL AND MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL, IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE TO COME TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT CARTER. I AM SURE THAT YOU WILL AGREE THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS FACED FEW, IF ANY, MORE CRUCIAL CHALLENGES THAN IT FACES TODAY -- A CHALLENGE TO ITS POLITICAL COHESION AND ITS ABILITY TO MAKE DIFFICULT DEFENSE AND POLITICAL DECISIONS. BASED ON THE EXCELLENT PREPARATIONS OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND THE SPECIAL GROUP, WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THIS CHALLENGE CAN BE MET.

. BEFORE THIS GROUP, I DON'T NEED TO BELABOR THE DETAILS OF THE CHALLENGE POSED BY SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE DEPLOYMENTS. IF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE WERE TO REMAIN UNANSWERED, THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT COME TO BELIEVE THAT THROUGH THEIR MILITARY EFFORTS THEY HAVE ACHIEVED WHAT THEY HAVE LONG SOUGHT -- PREPONDERANCE ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND DECOUPLING THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE FROM US STRATEGIC FORCES AND THE DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA.

. THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER THE US STRATEGIC DETERRENT IS FIRMLY COUPLED WITH THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THIS, AS THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE CLEAR MANY TIMES. THE PROBLEM IS RATHER THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT COME TO BELIEVE THAT THEY HAD IN FACT ACHIEVED THEIR GOAL OF DECOUPLING AND BEGIN TO ACT ACCORDINGLY.

. BOTH THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL NATURE OF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE HAVE TAKEN ON GREATER URGENCY IN RECENT WEEKS. THE SS-20 BUILD-UP CONTINUES. WE HAVE RECENTLY NOTED THE ADDITION OF A NEW SS-20 BASE UNDER INITIAL CONSTRUCTION IN RECENT WEEKS. AND WE HAVE ALSO SEEN WHAT MAY BE A NEW, MORE WIDELY DISPERSED, CONFIGURATION OF SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS WHICH COULD MAKE OUR TASK OF KEEPING TRACK OF THE SS-20S EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. THESE DEVELOPMENTS BRING THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SS-20 BASES OPERATIONAL OR UNDER CONSTRUCTION TO AT LEAST 21; AND AT LEAST 13 OF THESE ARE WITHIN RANGE OF WESTERN EUROPE.

. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE CONTINUING TO GATHER MORE DISTURBING EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE NOT RETIRING THE SS-4 AND 5 SYSTEMS AS WE HAD EXPECTED THEY WOULD WHEN THE SS-20S ENTERED THE FORCE. AS A RESULT THE SOVIETS MAY PLAN AN EVEN LARGER MEDIUM AND INTERMEDIATE RANGE LAND-BASED MISSILE CAPABILITY THAN THE ROUGHLY 600 WARHEADS OPPOSITE WESTERN EUROPE WE HAD PROJECTED EARLIER.

. WHILE THESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS GO FORWARD, THE POLITICAL NATURE OF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY CLEAR. WE CAN WELCOME PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF 20,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS AND 1,000 TANKS AS A SMALL STEP TOWARD ELIMINATION OF THE DISPARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE CAN WELCOME THE OFFER TO NEGOTIATE BUT NOT THE PROPOSAL THAT IN ESSENCE IF NATO DOES NOTHING WE CAN MEET WITH THE SOVIETS TO RATIFY THEIR SUPERIORITY IN LRINF. MOREOVER, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE MAIN MOTIVATION OF PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AND SUBSEQUENT SOVIET ACTIVITIES IS TO PREVENT ALLIANCE TNF MODERNIZATION. THE SPEECH HAS RAISED THE POLITICAL STAKES FOR THE ALLIANCE.

. IF ANYTHING, THESE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS STRENGTHEN OUR RESOLVE TO MOVE FORWARD TO ALLIANCE TNF DECISIONS IN DECEMBER -- THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP, AND UNDERTAKING PRACTICAL ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES INVOLVING TNF, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE SPECIAL GROUP.

. THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES WILL CLOSE THE GAP IN THE LADDER OF DETERRENCE. THUS, THIS STEP WILL ENSURE THE NECESSARY MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DETER ATTACK, DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIETS OUR INTENT TO PRESERVE OUR SECURITY, AND PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT WILL ENSURE THE FIRM LINKAGE OF US STRATEGIC FORCES TO EUROPE'S DEFENSE.

EQUALLY IMPORTANT, WHILE WE PROCEED WITH DEPLOYMENTS WE MUST MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BRING LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER CONTROL. IT WOULD NOT BE IN THE ALLIANCE'S INTEREST TO BE DRAWN INTO AN UNRESTRICTED THEATER NUCLEAR ARMS COMPETITION WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THAT IS WHY THE US SUPPORTS THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP TO MOVE RAPIDLY IN THE SALT 3 FRAMEWORK TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAT WOULD SET EQUAL CEILINGS ON THE LAND-BASED LONG-RANGE MISSILE CAPABILITY OF BOTH SIDES.

. PRESIDENTXCARTER IT IS PRESIDENT CARTER'S BELIEF THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE TIMID IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. WE SHOULD TRY TO CUT THE SOVIET LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR MISSILE THREAT TO EUROPE. THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO A DOWNWARD ADJUSTMENT IN OUR OWN DEPLOYMENT NEEDS DOES NOT MEAN THAT WE CAN POSTPONE A DEPLOYMENT DECISION WHILE AWAITING THE RESULTS OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. ONLY IF THE SOVIET UNION IS FACED WITH CONCRETE ACTION IN THE DEPLOYMENT AREA WILL THEY AGREE TO REDUCE AND LIMIT THEIR OWN FORCES.

THE PROGRAM OF THE HLG AND SG IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE PRESIDENT. I WANT TO STRESS THAT THE PRESIDENT SHARES THE BELIEF OF OTHER ALLIANCE LEADERS THAT WE SHOULD TAKE THE ALLIANCE TNF DECISIONS IN DECEMBER. ONCE THE LRTNF PROGRAM IS APPROVED BY NATO MINISTERS IN DECEMBER, HE IS READY TO MOVE FORWARD TO SEEK THE NECESSARY FUNDS FROM CONGRESS FOR THIS PROGRAM, WHICH I HARDLY NEED UNDERLINE WILL BE A COSTLY ONE. THE PRESIDENT IS ALSO READY TO MOVE QUICKLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SALT THREE TO DEAL WITH THEATER NUCLEAR ISSUES, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE SPECIAL GROUP. HE LOOKS FORWARD TO CLOSE CONSULTATION AMONG THE NATO ALLIES AS WE MOVE TOGETHER INTO THESE DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS. GIVEN THE PRESIDENT'S EFFORTS IN SALT TWO ESPECIALLY THE RATIFICATION PROCESS WHICH IS NOW MOVING FORWARD AGAIN AS A RESULT OF GREAT POLITICAL EFFORT ON HIS PART THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION ABOUT THE COMMITMENT OF THE US AND ESPECIALLY PRESIDENT CARTER TO ARMS CONTROL.

. THESE COMMITMENTS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE DOCUMENTS BEFORE US TODAY, IT IS NO ACCIDENT THAT THESE DOCUMENTS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICIES OF MOST OF THE GOVERNMENTS REPRESENTED AROUND THIS TABLE, FOR THEY ARE THE RESULT OF AN INTENSIVE CONSULTATION PROCESS THAT MAY BE UNIQUE IN THE ALLIANCE'S HISTORY.

. UNDER DAVE MCGIFFERT'S CHAIRMANSHIP THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP HAS BEEN WORKING ON THE TNF MODERNIZATION QUESTION FOR ALMOST TWO YEARS. WITH REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW AT THE HELM, THE SPECIAL GROUP HAS BEEN EXAMINING TNF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES SINCE EARLY THIS YEAR. THE ACTIVITIES OF THESE GROUPS EXEMPLIFY THE BEST OF THE CONSULTATIVE NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE CONSULTING GENUINELY AMONG OURSELVES TO REACH JOINT POSITIONS. AS THESE GROUPS PROCEEDED STEP-BY-STEP IN THEIR WORK, BEGINNING WITH GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND MOVING TO THE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WE HAVE BEFORE US NOW, WE IN THE US PROCEEDED FORWARD WITH OUR OWN INTERNAL POLICY DELIBERATIONS, AS DID OTHER ALLIANCE GOVERNMENTS. A BROAD POLITICAL CONSENSUS WITHIN AND AMONG OUR GOVERNMENTS HAS DEVELOPED AND IS CAPTURED IN THE INTEGRATED DOCUMENT AND DRAFT COMMUNIQUE.

. IN THOSE DOCUMENTS, I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS ONE PARTICULAR ASPECT WHICH WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED IN THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP AND SPECIAL GROUP WORK. THIS IS THE MATTER OF THE 1,000 WARHEAD WITHDRAWAL. ON REVIEWING THE WORK OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP IN WASHINGTON, WE SAW THAT AN ALLIANCE DECISION TO DEPLOY 572 PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE WARHEADS PRESENTED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR RATIONALIZATION OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN EUROPE. CONSEQUENTLY, WE FELT THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY THAT AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE DECEMBER TNF DECISIONS THE ALLIANCE COULD AGREE TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM EUROPE. FOR THIS REASON WE HAVE INCLUDED IN PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 20 OF THE DECISION DOCUMENT AND IN PARAGRAPH 7 OF THE COMMUNIQUE NEW LANGUAGE.

. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS STEP WOULD HAVE A NUMBER OF ADVANTAGES:

. --IN CONNECTION WITH A DECISION TO MODERNIZE LONG-RANGE TNF, THIS STEP IS MILITARILY FEASIBLE. IN FACT, IT IS MILITARILY DESIRABLE SINCE BY THE END OF THE YEAR WE WILL HAVE OVER 1,000 WARHEADS WHICH HAVE BEEN KEPT IN EUROPE FOR SOME TIME PENDING EASTERN AGREEMENT TO AN OFFER TO WITHDRAW THESE 1,000 WARHEADS IN MBFR.

. --MOVING FORWARD NOW WITH THIS WITHDRAWAL WOULD UNDERLINE THAT NATO'S TNF DECISION IS NOT PART OF A NUCLEAR BUILD-UP AND DOES NOT ENTAIL AN INCREASE IN NATO'S RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS SUCH, IT IMPROVES THE POLITICAL CLIMATE FOR TNF DECISIONS.

. --IN ADDITION, THIS STEP WOULD UNDERMINE THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AND OTHER SOVIET ATTEMPTS TO DEPICT NATO AS AN EXPANDING NUCLEAR THREAT WHICH RISKS UPSETTING THE NUCLEAR BALANCE. IN ESSENCE, IT WOULD BE A RESPONSE TO BREZHNEV'S PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE.

. --IT WOULD ALSO OPEN THE WAY FOR MOVEMENT IN MBFR BASED ON A SIMPLIFIED PROPOSAL. SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT OF A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF UP TO 20,000 TROOPS AND 1,000 TANKS, AND A NATO AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAW THE 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS PREVIOUSLY OFFERED IN MBFR, WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION OF APPROPRIATE NEXT STEPS IN MBFR. THESE SEPARATE STEPS BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE ALLIANCE PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I PROPOSAL. WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH A SIMPLIFIED PHASE I APPROACH TO MBFR SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON A PRIORITY BASIS IN ORDER TO GIVE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE, BUT NOT IMPERATIVE, IF SUCH A PROPOSAL COULD BE AGREED IN THE ALLIANCE IN DECEMBER. WE WOULD WELCOME THE CONTRIBUTION OF OTHER ALLIES ABOUT SUCH AN APPROACH AND WILL BE MAKING OUR OWN CONTRIBUTIONS AS WELL. TO ENSURE SPEEDY CONSIDERATION, WE HOPE THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL WILL TAKE A FIRM HAND, AIDED PERHAPS BY THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE IN ITS DEPUTY PERMREPS CONFIGURATION.

• MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL, WE ARE NOW PREPARED TO DISCUSS
THE DRAFT INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENTS AND LOOK FORWARD
TO RECEIVING THE VIEWS OF OUR ALLIES.
