

"The International Institute for Strategic Studies" i London har den 8. november 1979 udsendt en meddelelse til pressen med følgende ordlyd:

I "Military Balance 1979-80", udgivet i september, præsenterede IISS en detailleret studie af balancen vedrørende TNF i Europa.

I de forløbne uger er denne analyse gentagne gange blevet citeret ude af sin sammenhæng som støtte for modstand mod NATO's planer om indførelsen af nye langt-rækkende TNF. Under hensyn til en sådan beslutningsvigtighed og Instituttets ønske om at fremskaffe pålidelige oplysninger til den offentlige debat, føler vi det påkrævet at præcisere, hvad studien giver udtryk for.

Instituttets analyse fører ikke til den konklusion, at moderniseringen af NATO's TNF er unødvendig. Vi udtalte i vor studie, at "der i øjeblikket er noget nær ligevægt mellem NATO's og Warszawapagtens TNF, selvom denne ligevægt forskydes til gunst for Warszawapagten." De nye amerikanske TNF, som for tiden diskuteres i NATO, vil ikke blive indført før i slutningen af 1983 og til den tid vil den østlige sides marginale fordel yderligere være øget, såfremt der ikke handles nu.

Instituttets analyse viser, at der særlig er uligevægt, hvad angår sprænghoveder til fremførelse på missiler med længere rækkevidde end 1.000 miles. Her viser tallene, at Warszawapagten har en fordel på 10 til 1, hvis de amerikanske strategiske missiler, som er tildelt SACEUR, holdes uden for beregningen. (I modsætning til de sovjetiske "theatre" systemer tæller disse strategiske missiler med i SALT).

Størsteparten af NATO's nukleare gengældelsesstyrker består af fly. Ikke alene er disse sårbare over for forebyggende ("pre-emptive") angreb, men det er i stadig højere grad tvivlsomt, om de vil være istand til at gennemtrænge Warszawapagtens tætte luftforsvar. Dette sidste punkt er faktisk et af de stærke militære argumenter for moderniseringen af NATO's TNF.

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JA/WM

26th November 1979

Henning Gottlieb,
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105 I 40213

My Dear Henning,

I am aware that the TNF Modernization debate has become a very important issue in Danish politics and I gather that what the Institute has said about the Theatre Nuclear Balance has figured rather largely in that debate.

I hope you saw our Press Release issued some three weeks ago which was intended to clarify our position, but you might like a little background as to why we felt it necessary to make this statement of clarification.

As you know, the analysis produced by us in the Military Balance 1979-80 was an honest and well-meaning attempt to set out the facts for the public debate as we see them. The problem is always that people will use such an analysis partially and without scruple to support particular arguments and without taking account of the many carefully-worded assumptions that we made. I think these important points stand out. First we were careful to put American strategic warheads (Poseidon) in a different category so making clear that if there was not a very great disparity in systems over one hundred miles, it was only the Poseidon warheads - which are of course SALT counted - which sustained the NATO position. Secondly we pointed out the effects of Soviet dynamism on the balance. Thirdly we are concerned at the increasing vulnerability of NATO's nuclear-capable aircraft on the ground and their doubtful penetrative qualities. This is a powerful argument in favour of moving to less vulnerable and more reliable systems almost regardless of the state of the numerical balance. As things are now, the invitation to the Warsaw Pact to pre-empt is rather disturbingly great.

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When that last point is coupled to the disparity in longer-range systems which our study shows - particularly noticeable in the case of long range land-based missiles - we continue to believe that there is a case for a moderate upgrading of NATO's TNF in particular categories primarily with a view to reducing vulnerability and to maintaining the deterrent effect through an assurance of penetration.

There is very much more to be said but you are well aware of the arguments and I will not waste your time by going through them. Nevertheless I hope what I have said here clarifies our position.

With all best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'Jonathan Alford', with a long horizontal line extending to the right from the end of the signature.

Colonel Jonathan Alford
Deputy Director