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N A T O S E C R E T

BRUXELLES
BILAG
13 FEB 1980

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH
17th December 1979

PO/79/138

To: Permanent Representatives of

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UM0316

13 FEB 1980

ex. 245-247 - date

3 x 1

13 FEB 1980

105-148-7

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(this document is for...)

x 246 for Anders R. med referat d. 1 1984

From: Secretary General

JOINT MEETING OF FOREIGN AND DEFENCE MINISTERS
ON WEDNESDAY, 12TH DECEMBER 1979

DECISIONS

Attached is the Integrated Decision Document on Long-Range Theatre Nuclear Force Modernization and Arms Control as approved by Foreign and Defence Ministers of your respective countries at their joint meeting on Wednesday 12th December 1979.

(Signed) Joseph M.A.H. LUNS

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N A T O S E C R E T

INTEGRATED DECISION DOCUMENTLONG-RANGE THEATRE NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION
AND ARMS CONTROLI. INTRODUCTION

1. This document represents the conclusions and decisions reached by Foreign and Defense Ministers of the Alliance participating in the special meeting in Brussels on 12th December, 1979. It comprises the rationale for Theatre Nuclear Force (TNF) modernization and for a parallel arms control approach, and the decisions on the modernization programme and on objectives and principles for arms control. In reaching their decisions, Ministers noted the constructive reports of the NPG High Level Group on Long Range Theatre Nuclear Force (LRTNF) Modernization and the Special Group on Arms Control and Related Matters, circulated by the Secretary General under cover of PO/79/132. Together with this document, these reports form the basis for the Alliance decisions on LRTNF.

II. RATIONALE

2. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet decisions to implement programmes modernizing and expanding their long-range forces substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS-20 missile, which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theatre rôle. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in LRTNF both quantitatively and qualitatively, western LRTNF capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long-range theatre nuclear missile systems. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernization and expansion of their shorter-range TNF and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces.

3. The developments took place against the background of increasing Soviet intercontinental strategic capabilities and the achievement of parity in intercontinental weapon systems with the United States. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theatre nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in central strategic systems. The fact

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that western longer-range theatre systems are aging could also cast doubt on the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear responses to aggression.

4. This situation could give rise to the risk that the Soviets might believe - however incorrectly - that they could use long-range forces to make or threaten limited strikes against Western Europe from a 'sanctuary' in the Soviet Union. There could be a misperception that without strong theatre-based systems of its own capable of reaching Soviet territory and in an era of parity at the strategic nuclear level, NATO lacked credible and appropriate means of response.

5. Over the last two years the Alliance has identified the need to modernize its own longer-range TNF capability in order to maintain the security of the Alliance, to replace obsolescent weapon systems, and to ensure a credible continuum of deterrence by being able to strike Soviet territory with land-based systems in Europe. This modernization is part of NATO's continuing efforts to maintain and improve its capabilities and will be accomplished without increasing the Alliance's reliance on nuclear weapons or lowering the nuclear threshold in Europe.

6. The modernization of TNF will permit NATO to rationalize and reduce its overall nuclear stockpile in Europe. Such an effort is consistent with the principles and findings of the HLG: that there is a need for an evolutionary upward adjustment in NATO's LRTNF; that adjustment carries no implication of increased rôles for NATO's theatre nuclear forces or an increase in NATO's stockpile of nuclear warheads but rather is designed to close a growing gap in the spectrum of deterrence; and that accommodation of the additional LRTNF warhead requirement without increase in the total stockpile necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. Because modernization and arms control involving TNF strengthen the NATO deterrent, lessen the likelihood of Soviet miscalculation and can lead to greater stability and security for the Alliance, a decision to rationalize and reduce the overall nuclear stockpile beyond the one-for-one replacement in connection with the deployment of new LRTNF can be made as an integral part of the modernization decision. This decision supports the Alliance's position that TNF modernization should not increase NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons, and should enhance the Alliance's political position.

7. The requirements of the agreed strategy of flexible response as articulated in MC 14/3 form the fundamental basis for modernization. The policies adopted herein are intended

to strengthen the deterrent value of the theatre nuclear leg of the NATO Triad and reinforce the linkage between theatre and strategic nuclear forces consistent with the requirements of flexible response. Augmentation of NATO LRTNF based in Europe would therefore increase options for restrained and controlled responses, thereby reducing the risk of Soviet misperception and strengthening deterrence.

8. LRTNF modernization is also consistent with the improvements in forces outlined in the Long-Term Defense Programme (LTDP), which gives priority to conventional force improvements but also considers TNF improvements. The recommended adjustments of LRTNF called for here are in conformity with the requirements of NATO; they will not increase the rôle of TNF in this strategy, but will strengthen deterrence and will reinforce the linkage to the strategic leg of the Triad. Thus central strategic systems remain the ultimate deterrent. Finally, this collective decision on a co-ordinated programme in this field demonstrates and reinforces Alliance cohesion and resolve.

9. The primary aims in TNF policy are deterrence and stability based upon a triad of forces, the coupling between these forces, and on the important political principle of the strategic unity of the Alliance. These aims can be served by two complementary programmes, force modernization and arms control.

10. In parallel* with TNF modernization special consideration has been given to the rôle arms control can play in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West, and in advancing the process of détente. The Alliance regards arms control as an integral part of its efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member States by making the strategic situation which the Alliance faces more stable, more predictable, and more manageable, and by seeking lower levels of weapons on both sides.

11. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet buildup can enhance Alliance security and modify the scale of NATO's TNF modernization requirements. Thus, concrete arms control results could lead to a downward adjustment in the scale of NATO's TNF requirements. One could postulate an arms control outcome so successful that the Soviet modern long-range theatre nuclear threat was eliminated, thereby permitting NATO to consider suspending its own LRTNF modernization plans. As a practical matter, however, such an outcome is highly unlikely, and posing it as a realistic possibility could lead to an immediate and lasting impasse, while Soviet deployments grew. Therefore, any achievable arms control outcome involving TNF would not in the first step, eliminate entirely the Soviet

* of the Danish proposal as presented at the Permanent Representatives' meeting on 28th November 1979

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LRTNF threat and would not obviate the need for some LRTNF modernization to meet the Alliance's own security requirements. The extent to which it can adjust the scale of concrete measures aimed at meeting the continuous armament effort of the Warsaw Pact will depend in part on the degree of success in achieving effective and balanced limitations on LRTNF of both sides through arms control negotiations.

12. Thus both TNF modernization and arms control involving TNF are in line with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defense and détente, as enunciated in the Harmel Report: "Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defense is a stabilizing factor in world politics. It is a necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions." In this spirit, parallel decisions on TNF modernization and arms control will continue to advance the Alliance's policy of détente.

13. A policy of parallel and integrated LRTNF deployments and arms control will best achieve maximum improvement in Alliance security. This integration is sought both to ensure that defense decisions and implementation of them are not made hostage to expectations of disarmament agreements, and so that arms control itself has a realistic chance of success. Moreover, negotiations involving LRTNF will not be realistic or possible without an agreed modernization plan and a decision to implement it.

III. DECISIONS

14. Ministers therefore adopted the following integrated LRTNF programmes, based on the work of the High Level Group and the Special Group.*

A. LRTNF Modernization

15. Ministers agreed that NATO's LRTNF modernization goals can best be met by a deployment of 572 warheads involving basing of ballistic and cruise missiles, land-based Pershing II (PII) ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM), respectively.

16. In reaching decisions on the size and composition of this programme, account was taken of a convergence of military and political needs. The Soviet TNF build-up, which weakens NATO's military capability, needs to be redressed convincingly. The modernization programme will ensure there are no weak links in NATO's spectrum of military options. A NATO capability for selective nuclear strikes requires numbers sufficient to survive enemy attacks and to reach enough targets to influence the course of conflict. Likewise, the programme must be sufficiently large to provide an incentive for the Soviets to engage in serious arms control negotiations.

* For the positions of the Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands see Annexes I and II respectively

17. Ministers expressed their intent to provide clear political and public support for all aspects of this NATO programme. Ministers approved the deployment scheme presented below to provide appropriate participation in the hosting of LRTNF. This deployment scheme, involving basing of LRTNF in a number of NATO countries, together with financial support by all countries for the construction of facilities eligible for infrastructure programme funding, demonstrates the Alliance's solidarity and willingness to share risks and will enhance the survivability and credibility of the force.

LRTNF SYSTEMS DEPLOYMENTS

SYSTEMS	LAUNCHERS	WARHEADS	UNITS	COUNTRIES
PII	108	108	3 BNS	GE
GLCM	24	96	6 FLTS	GE
GLCM	40	160	10 FLTS	UK
GLCM	28	112	7 FLTS	IT
GLCM	12	48	3 FLTS	BE
GLCM	12	48	3 FLTS	NL

18. The construction of new facilities will be funded through the NATO infrastructure programme. So that the LRTNF programme will not adversely affect the NATO force improvements, during the mid-term review of the five-year ceiling in 1982-83, the ceiling will be increased to account for the requirements stemming from LRTNF modernization.

19. The LRTNF modernization programme will also involve appropriate host nation manning support as recommended by the High Level Group, in those nations where the US will own and operate LRTNF units.

20. The LRTNF programme will not result in an increased rôle for theatre nuclear forces in NATO's strategy, or in an increase in NATO's stockpile of nuclear warheads. As new warheads for the long-range theatre nuclear systems are deployed, the same number of warheads will be withdrawn from the existing nuclear stockpile in Europe. In addition as an integral part of their TNF modernization decision, Ministers further agreed, based on Alliance consideration, on a withdrawal of 1,000 US nuclear warheads from Europe, to take place as soon as feasible as a step in the rationalization of the Alliance's nuclear force posture. This reduction and the subsequent accommodation of the additional LRTNF warhead requirement, without an increase in the level of the stockpile, necessarily imply a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges.

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21. Ministers further noted that the Nuclear Planning Group will proceed with an examination of the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of rôles and systems in NATO's theatre nuclear armoury as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG Ministers in the Autumn of 1980.

B. Arms control

22. In developing and pursuing a policy on arms control involving TNF in parallel with the preparation and implementation of Alliance decisions on the modernization of LRTNF, Ministers concurred that concrete and realistic arms control proposals should be formulated in order to achieve the following objectives:

- (1) to maintain and enhance the overall security of the Alliance;
- (2) to reduce the growing disparity in long-range theatre nuclear systems, which has been highlighted by Soviet deployments of the SS-20;
- (3) to avoid unconstrained competition and increasing instability in the theatre nuclear field, and to achieve security at balanced lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides;
- (4) by means of concrete and realistic arms control proposals, to counter Soviet efforts to interfere in Alliance decision-making through vague disarmament offers designed to hinder Alliance TNF modernization decisions; and
- (5) to enhance the strategic unity of the Alliance and the coherence of the Alliance's strategy of deterrence and defence.

23. In pursuit of these objectives, Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance, to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

- (1) arms control involving TNF must be a complement to, not a substitute for, TNF modernization;

- (2) arms control negotiations involving TNF should be conducted within the SALT III framework;
- (3) because negotiations in SALT III involving TNF would be of great significance to the overall security of the Alliance, there should be special consultative arrangements on positions to be taken in these negotiations;
- (4) Alliance objectives in SALT III negotiations involving TNF and in MBFR should be consistent and mutually supportive;
- (5) negotiations on TNF in SALT III must be predicated on the US statement on gray area systems, "any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems";
- (6) arms control negotiations involving TNF should not include non-US Allied systems, nor should the US negotiate with the Soviets compensation for such systems;
- (7) any agreement on TNF must ensure de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights;
- (8) any arms control agreement involving TNF should be adequately verifiable;
- (9) negotiations involving TNF in the SALT III framework should further the objective of a balanced and stable overall nuclear relationship between the US and the USSR and should reflect the strategic unity of the Alliance as well as support the continuum of deterrence;
- (10) arms control negotiations involving TNF should be a step-by-step process. The first step should focus on the most immediate threat, with the stringency and scope of limitations sought as ambitious as the Alliance can realistically expect to achieve and verify. Subsequent steps could provide an opportunity to expand the scope of systems covered and to increase the stringency of limitations sought, including reductions;

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- (11) the initial step should focus on limiting and reducing the threat posed by those Soviet long-range theatre nuclear missile systems in a position to strike NATO, especially the most modern and capable of those systems - the SS-20:
- (a) the aim should be to stop SS-20 deployments short of their projected level, force the retirements of SS-4S and SS-5S, and thereby achieve a reduction in the overall threat;
 - (b) warheads-on-launchers would provide an effective unit of limitation on long-range theatre missiles;
 - (c) the limitations should apply to world-wide long-range land-based theatre nuclear missile deployments, but should especially restrict those deployments within striking range of NATO;
- (12) while initially focusing on long-range missiles, other elements of the TNF threat should also be taken into account:
- (a) limits on long-range aircraft in general should not be sought in the first step, except for Backfire in an appropriate manner;
 - (b) short-range systems should not be addressed in the first step.

24. Ministers agreed that given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the US negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defence Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in other arms control negotiations at their semi-annual meetings.

POSITION OF BELGIUM

Having noted the consensus within NATO, the Belgian Delegation announced that its Government would fall in with the decision taken but emphasised that the application of this decision to Belgian territory would have to be confirmed by the Belgian Government in May 1980 after analysis of what was hoped would be a positive reply from the Soviet Union to the signal sent out by NATO, reflected by practical measures designed to restore a balanced situation.

POSITION OF THE NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands Government stated that, while agreeing with the reasons for LRTNF modernization mentioned in the Integrated Decision Document, it is not able to decide on the deployment of Ground Launched Cruise Missiles on its territory at this juncture, and that it will take a decision on this question by December 1981 in the light of a continuing evaluation of the degree of success in achieving effective and balanced limitations on LRTNF of both sides.