



Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968

Volume XII

Western Europe

Editors James E. Miller
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Denmark

1. Editorial Note

On January 21, 1968, a fire broke out aboard a nuclear-armed U.S. Strategic Air Command B-52 bomber, based at Plattsburgh Air Force Base in New York, while it was over Greenland on a routine mission. The pilot sought to make an emergency landing at Thule Air Force Base in Greenland but then ordered an immediate evacuation when smoke filled the cabin and electrical power went out. The pilotless aircraft crashed 7½ miles from Thule Base on the ice of North Star Bay. The conventional high explosives in the B-52's four thermonuclear bombs went off, scattering radioactive debris over the ice, but there was no nuclear detonation. Six of the seven crew members survived. For more information on the accident, see Scott D. Sagan, *The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pages 156–203. In its January 22 press release announcing the crash, the Department of Defense stated that the aircraft carried nuclear weapons but that they were unarmed and thus there was no danger of a nuclear explosion at the crash site. (Telegram 102343, January 22; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967–69, DEF 17 US)

On January 22 U.S. Ambassador to Denmark Katherine White warned the Department of State the “repercussions in Denmark may be severe in light of special nuclear sensitivities.” (Telegram 2814 from Copenhagen; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1) Within hours Danish Foreign Minister Tabor issued a press release stating, in part: “The Danish policy regarding nuclear weapons also applies to Greenland and also the air space over Greenland. There are no nuclear weapons in Greenland. The American authorities are aware of Denmark’s nuclear policy and the Danish Govt assumes that there are no American over-flights of Greenland by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.” (Telegram 2835 from Copenhagen, January 22; *ibid.*) Two hours later Danish Prime Minister Krag made a similar statement, specifying that “there can be no overflights over Greenland by aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.” (Telegram 2838 from Copenhagen, January 22; *ibid.*) Both statements noted, however, that in times of emergency it could become necessary for an American aircraft to land in Greenland.

The statements by Tabor and Krag expressed a view of Danish nuclear policy that differed markedly from the way it was understood by U.S. officials, a difference that precipitated 4 months of negotiations resulting in a new agreement between the two countries. This critical pe-

riod in relations between Denmark and the United States—and the Cold War developments that led up to it—later became the focus of a study commissioned by the Government of Denmark. In 1995 the Danish Government asked the newly-established Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI) to produce a historical review of U.S. overflights of Greenland with nuclear weapons and the role of Thule Air Force Base in that connection for the period from 1945 to 1968. The government also asked that the report deal with the decision-making process and the general situation so far as security policy and international relations were concerned.

In 1997 DUPI submitted to the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs and then published a two-volume study entitled *Grønland under den kolde krig: Dansk og amerikansk sikkerhedspolitik, 1945–68* (*Greenland During the Cold War: Danish and American Security Policy, 1945–68*). DUPI indicated that its access to Danish Government archives had, in general, been satisfactory but that its extensive research in U.S. Government archives did not include privileged access. Volume 1, in Danish, contains 614 pages of analysis. Volume 2 contains facsimiles of 102 documents from Danish and U.S. archives. DUPI also published a 51-page *Summary* consisting of an English translation of the concluding chapter of volume 1.

2. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 23, 1968, 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

U.S. Air Force Routes

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Torben Rønne, Embassy of Denmark
 Mr. Per Fergo, Minister-Counselor, Embassy of Denmark
 Assistant Secretary John M. Leddy, EUR
 Deputy Assistant Secretary Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., EUR
 Mr. David H. McKillop, Country Director, SCAN
 Mr. Eugene Klebenov, Country Desk Officer, SCAN

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 17 US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov. The memorandum is Part III of III. According to a memorandum of conversation marked Part I of III, the group first discussed a proposed Department of Defense press release that described the findings of the ground survey team that visited the crash site. (Ibid.) The meeting was held in Leddy's office.

Mr. Leddy said that the statements by Danish Government leaders on nuclear storage and overflights² had come as a surprise to us. Ambassador Rønne said that Prime Minister Krag and Foreign Minister Tabor had merely re-stated Danish nuclear policy. Mr. Leddy said that we did not want to go any further into this question; that we saw no utility in pursuing the matter. Ambassador Rønne said that Danish nuclear policy covers Greenland, as the Krag and Tabor statements had pointed out. Mr. Leddy replied that we had not contradicted these statements, but that we do not want to get into a public discussion on the matter of routes; that we believe it would be most unwise to open such a discussion. Therefore, we could not add to the statement (attachment B)³ a reference to overflights. Under the circumstances, it would probably be just as well to have no statement at all.

Ambassador Rønne said that Premier Krag would, the following day, be questioned on Danish nuclear policy. The Ambassador added that Mr. Leddy was familiar with Denmark's policy in this area. Mr. Leddy said that he felt that statement could create more problems than it solved but that he would accede to its release. He added that we did not want to set off another round of routes discussion and that we could not go any further than the present statement.

Ambassador Rønne said that lack of further U.S. comment could indicate that the U.S. does not accept Denmark's foreign policy on nuclear matters. Mr. Leddy said that it was simply that we do not comment in a way that could lead people to speculate on alert flight routes. Ambassador Rønne said that the lack of U.S. Government comment left him in a very difficult situation. Mr. Leddy pointed out that the Danish Government had made its policy statements; that we did not challenge these statements but will not comment further on this subject. Ambassador Rønne said that he was very unhappy with the situation, and that he would be informing his Government.

Ambassador Rønne said that he would call later in the evening and let us know if the Danish Government concurred in the two press statements. Mr. Leddy said that, on receiving concurrence from the Danes, we would notify the Department of Defense for an 8:00 am release, January 27.

[Since the Danish Government found the shorter statement (attachment B) inadequate, the USG did not release it.]⁴

² See Document 1.

³ Attached is the text of a proposed Department of Defense press release, which was transmitted to Copenhagen in telegram 103632, January 23. The press release stated that news stories claiming that the B-52 was scheduled to land at Thule Airfield were wrong; the B-52 was scheduled to return to Plattsburgh Air Force Base after completing its mission without any intervening landings elsewhere; furthermore, there were "no scheduled landings of B-52's at Thule at any time."

⁴ Brackets in the source text.

3. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark¹**

Washington, January 27, 1968, 2320Z.

106058. Personal for the Ambassador from Leddy.

1. I called in Ambassador Rønne on the afternoon of January 21 and handed him an informal record of remarks on the background of our understandings with Denmark on the questions of storage and overflights with respect to nuclear weapons.² The text is being sent you by separate telegram.³ I suggested that he communicate this record personally to Prime Minister Krag only.

2. I also showed Rønne, but did not leave with him, the texts of Embtel 406 of November 18, 1967⁴ and Embtel 519 of February 6, 1964.⁵

3. In making this information available to him I explained that we had done so because it had appeared to us that the public statements of Prime Minister Krag and Foreign Minister Tabor on the questions of storage and overflights seemed to us to be inconsistent with the tacit understandings between the two governments; that we had realized that these understandings had been closely held within the Danish Government; and that in view of the delicacy of the matter we had delayed reminding the Danish Government of these understandings in the hope that the Danish leaders themselves would become aware of them from their own sources within the Danish Government.

4. Rønne said that he personally had been completely familiar with Denmark's NATO files on this subject up to 1962 (he was chief of NATO and military affairs in FonOff 1957–62) and had never heard of these understandings. However, he raised no question about them nor did he seem surprised. He concentrated instead on the inadequacy of the public statement suggested in paragraph four⁶ and on the need for the US to make some statement of its own which would reassure the Danish people. We should at least say that there have been no nuclear overflights since the accident. I replied that it would be unwise to attempt to work out at this point any statement going beyond the one proposed in Deptel 103632⁷ which we have not used because it did not

¹ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1. Top Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Leddy, cleared by McKillop, and approved by Leddy.

² Document 4.

³ Telegram 106059 to Copenhagen, January 27. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1)

⁴ This reference is incorrect. Presumably Leddy is referring to telegram 419 from Copenhagen, November 18, 1957. See footnote 4, Document 4.

⁵ See footnote 6, Document 4.

⁶ Paragraph 4 of Document 4.

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 2.

fully meet the desires of the Danish Government. I said that it seemed to me the only sensible course was for him first to report to Prime Minister Krag the informal record of the remarks which I had made so that he could view the matter in perspective. If the Danish Government then wished to raise with us the question of an additional public statement by the U.S. we would, of course, be willing to look at their suggestions. I reminded him, however, of the language in paragraph four of my remarks that the "U.S. Government must continue to stand by its policy of not confirming or denying publicly the presence of nuclear weapons on its aircraft or bases anywhere in the world". Rønne agreed with this course of action.

5. Rønne then said that since we have caused all the trouble we should make some public statement expressing regret and our understanding for the concern of the Danish people. I undertook to explore the possibility of releasing a statement along these lines at the earliest suitable occasion.

6. Rønne did not explicitly press for assurances for the future (carefully omitted from the record of my remarks), but indicated that the Danish Government was greatly concerned over the nuclear question in general and would no doubt wish to pursue it further. I said that we wanted to be sure that the outgoing government, which had been in power when our understandings had been reached, was fully informed and would of course always be willing to discuss these questions with the incoming government.

Rusk

4. Informal Record of Remarks¹

Washington, January 27, 1968.

INFORMAL RECORD OF REMARKS MADE TO AMBASSADOR RØNNE BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY LEDDY

1. Our review of the record indicates that in 1957 we determined that the effective operation of the strategic deterrent would require

¹ Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Top Secret. No indication of the drafting officer appears on the record. Leddy gave Rønne a verbatim copy of the record during their meeting on January 27 (see Document 3) which Rønne included in his January 27 telegram to Krag reporting on the meeting. Rønne's telegram is printed in *Greenland During the Cold War*, vol. 2, pp. 451–453.

sometime in the future storage of nuclear weapons at Thule, Greenland. Our records indicate that while we believed that Article II(b)(3)(ii) of the 1951 Defense Agreement² entitled us to store these weapons at Thule, nevertheless, we considered it important to determine whether your Government wished to be informed prior to introducing nuclear weapons into Greenland. Accordingly, our Ambassador made an approach of this nature to the then Prime Minister Hansen on November 13, 1957.³ On November 18, 1957, Prime Minister Hansen gave our Ambassador a written statement which he characterized as informal, personal, highly secret and limited to one copy each on the Danish and American side.⁴ This statement noted the United States Government's view of the Base Agreement and that we had not submitted a concrete plan for storage nor asked questions as to the attitude of the Danish Government. The Prime Minister concluded that in these circumstances no comment on his part was necessary. He was adamant, however, that there should be no publicity now or later since any kind of leak could be highly damaging to our two countries. Inasmuch as the Prime Minister did not register objection to the possibility of storage and did not request that he be informed prior to actual introduction of nuclear weapons, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] the United States Government.⁵

² For text of the 1951 Defense Agreement, which was signed at Copenhagen, April 27, 1951, and entered into force June 8, see 2 UST 1485.

³ Ambassador Peterson advised such a course of action in telegram 376, October 31, 1957, in the belief that the "general spirit of Dano-United States relations and cooperation in Greenland in defense matters puts us under moral obligation to be frank and open with Prime Minister on matter of such potential political importance for Denmark." The Department authorized an approach to Hansen in telegram 499, November 8. In telegram 406, November 13, Peterson reported that he had met that day with Hansen, who, because of the issue's "serious psychological and political implications," wanted to study it and meet again in a few days. All three telegrams are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1955–59, 711.56359. The difficulties that Hansen faced in responding to the U.S. approach are discussed in *Greenland During the Cold War, Summary*, pp. 21–22.

⁴ Peterson reported on the November 18 meeting and Hansen's statement in telegram 419 from Copenhagen, November 18, 1957. Peterson indicated that Hansen asked him to consider his copy of the statement "purely personal." (Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos) No copy of Hansen's statement has been found. In telegram 105056 to Copenhagen, January 26, 1968, the Department indicated that it could not locate a copy of Hansen's statement and asked whether the document or a copy existed in Embassy files. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1) The Embassy replied in the negative. (Telegram 2933, January 26; *ibid*) The text of Hansen's statement, from Danish archives, is printed in *Greenland During the Cold War, Summary*, pp. 23–24.

⁵ In telegram 3436 from Copenhagen, February 23, the Embassy reported that General Ramberg, Chief of Defense, Danish Armed Forces, had explained to the Embassy Counselor the previous evening that Danish anti-nuclear weapons policy was first authoritatively enunciated on December 2, 1957, at a NATO Ministerial meeting when Hansen stated that Denmark did not want nuclear weapons on its soil. Ramberg emphasized that Danish officials had always regarded this as an expression of the belief

2. Our records also indicate that the question of nuclear weapons operations from Thule was discussed early in 1964 by Under Secretary for Greenland Brun and Ambassador Blair in relation to an accident in the state of Maryland involving a U.S. bomber carrying nuclear weapons.⁶ This discussion frankly addressed the possibility that a similar accident could arise as a result of operations involving nuclear weapons at or near Thule which would raise difficult questions in the Folketing. Ambassador Blair suggested that if such an unfortunate incident ever occurred, the Danish Government could state that U.S. activities in Greenland had as their sole object the defense interests of the Free World and that they had been worked out in full cooperation with Danish defense forces and the Danish Government under terms and conditions of the 1951 Defense Agreement and in accordance with overall Danish policies. Under Secretary Brun made no objection to this proposal and pursued the matter no further.

3. In connection with overflights of Greenland, the effective operation of the strategic deterrent has also required that such flights involving nuclear weapons be carried on from time to time in accordance with Article V (3) of the 1951 Defense Agreement.

4. As for the current situation [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], nor are there now any overflights of Greenland by U.S. strategic aircraft.

I wish to emphasize again that in view of the sensitivity of military operations with nuclear weapons, the United States Government must continue to stand by its policy of neither confirming nor denying publicly the presence of nuclear weapons on its aircraft or bases anywhere in the world. In addition, I urge that your Government in addressing this problem publicly in the future limit itself to a statement along the following lines:

"U.S. operations in Greenland are the subject of regular consultation between the two Governments and are in accord with the 1951 Defense Agreement as well as their respective policies. The Government of Denmark is fully aware in this connection of its responsibilities to the Danish people in Greenland for their safety and defense. We are fully satisfied that the interests of the Danish people are being protected."

that nuclear weapons should not be stored on the soil of European Denmark. Ramberg was sure Hansen's remarks were uttered in a context that excluded Greenland. "At most, one might say prohibition against storage of nuclear weapons on Greenland was intended; certainly prohibition against overflights was never contemplated—particularly since overflights were guaranteed by 1951 treaty." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US)

⁶ A B-52 bomber carrying two nuclear weapons crashed in Maryland on January 13, 1964. Blair reported on his February 5 meeting with Brun in telegram 519 from Copenhagen, February 6. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1)

5. We hope that all public statements on this matter by either Government will be subject to consultation between the two Governments.

5. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark¹

Washington, January 28, 1968, 2334Z.

106092. Personal for Ambassador and Blankinship. Following memcon is uncleared FYI and subject to revision upon review.

1. Ambassador Rønne was received by the Secretary at 2:15 p.m. Jan 28² and stated Krag had instructed him to seek US approval of the statement text of which already sent us by Amb White: "The Danish Govt which has had contacts with the US Govt is in a position to confirm that in conformity with Danish atomic policy there are no nuclear weapons in Greenland, and no overflights of Greenland by planes carrying such weapons are undertaken."

2. Secretary stated he wished to make two observations: (a) Danish as well as US security depends upon US nuclear arrangements from which those countries receiving this protection cannot claim complete disassociation as if nuclear weapons did not exist, and (b) we have serious problem of how to deal with events in one country so as not to set up a chain reaction with other countries throughout world that could impair the American nuclear deterrent. To deal with this second problem we have adopted the policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of our nuclear weapons and have adhered to it rigidly. There is a difference between what the United States can say and what Denmark can say.

3. The Secretary noted that the proposed Danish statement associates it with the United States thus putting the United States in the position of confirming it, a departure from our policy. He then gave the Ambassador the following shorter statement and asked if the Danish Government might wish to say something along these lines: "The Danish Government confirms that there are no nuclear weapons stored in Greenland and no overflights of Greenland with nuclear weapons."

¹ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by McKillop and approved by Leddy.

² Just prior to meeting with Rusk, Rønne met with Leddy. A memorandum of their conversation is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17.

The Secretary stressed that if we were queried about such a statement issued by the Danish Government, we would refuse to comment. While we deeply regretted the crash, Danish public opinion is the Danish Government's problem, not ours, and one to be dealt with by a purely Danish statement.

4. Should any question of violation of our international obligations arise, the Secretary reminded the Ambassador of the secret understandings referred to in Assistant Secretary Leddy's informal memorandum to the Ambassador. (Nodis Deptels 106058 and 106059.)³ The Ambassador stated that he had been instructed to comment along the following lines on this point: "In light of the background of later developments, the Danish Govt considered that the historical observations made in the memorandum are considered to be without importance in the prevailing concrete situation." In that connection, the Ambassador referred to the many public pronouncements on Danish nuclear policy since the signing of the Greenland Agreement in 1951,⁴ including a statement in Parliament in April 1964 that Danish nuclear policy includes Greenland.

5. The Secretary replied that if the interpretation of "no importance" means that the question of the understandings is merely being put aside, that would cause no problem; but we could not accept an interpretation of it by which we could be accused of violating our understandings with Denmark.

6. Replying to the Ambassador's inquiry about the question of future overflights, the Secretary said he thought the text given the Ambassador covered the immediate problem and the question of the future could be left to the new government.

7. The Amb mentioned the possibility of Foreign Minister Tabor coming to the United States to discuss the problem. The Secretary made remarks which made it clear to Rønne that such a visit would not be welcome. He regretted that he would be completely tied up with the Korean problem and would not be in a position to receive the Foreign Minister on Monday, after which time Tabor might not be in office. The Ambassador commented that there was probably nothing more that Tabor could accomplish in any event. He said he would promptly inform Krag of our proposal.⁵

Rusk

³ See Document 3 and footnote 3 thereto.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 4.

⁵ On January 29 the Danish Government issued the following statement: "The Danish Government confirms that there are no nuclear weapons stored in Greenland and no overflights of Greenland with nuclear weapons." (Telegram 106766 to all NATO capitals, January 29; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 1967-69, DEF 17 US)

6. Intelligence Note¹

No. 85

Washington, January 31, 1968.

SUBJECT

Implications of the B-52 Crash for US-Scandinavian Military Arrangements

The crash near the Thule Base of the B-52 carrying nuclear weapons has increased criticism throughout the Scandinavian countries of US military policies. Such criticism was already substantial because of their dislike of the United States' Vietnam policy. This criticism could become strong enough to cause the governments of Denmark, Iceland, and possibly Norway to demand formal assurances from the US that no planes carrying nuclear weapons overfly their countries.

Denmark Most Concerned. While the Danish Government that was in caretaker status since the parliamentary election on January 23 has accepted US assurances that the B-52 approached Greenland only because it was seeking an emergency landing site, demands are rising in all political parties for an investigation into the question of whether US planes carrying nuclear weapons have overflown Greenland in the past. Press interviews with Greenlanders and with Danes working in Greenland who have stated that such flights have occurred have aroused widespread suspicion. All parties support the government's policy that no nuclear weapons may enter Danish territory (Greenland is considered an integral part of Denmark), and it appears likely that the new government currently being formed will feel forced to seek formal assurances from the US that such flights will not be undertaken.

How far the new government will go in restricting US military actions in and over Greenland will depend to a large extent on its composition. It now seems almost certain that this government, which is expected to be announced on February 1, will be a coalition of the rightist Conservative and Moderate Liberal Parties, who are the most friendly of all Danish parties to the US and NATO, and of the centrist Radical Liberal Party, which is pacifist-inclined. The leaders of the Radical Liberals, particularly their parliamentary spokesman, Hilmer Baunsgaard, who is expected to head the new government, are not formally opposed to Denmark's current security arrangements, including membership in NATO. However, they may attribute some of their heavy gains in the election—they doubled their parliamentary repre-

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. The intelligence note was forwarded to Rusk by INR Director Thomas R. Hughes.

sensation—to their campaign for drastic defense cuts and a referendum on Denmark's continued membership in NATO after 1969.

Some Leftists May Push for Anti-US Policies. Many of the Radical Liberals' new supporters and some of their newly elected parliamentary deputies are anti-militarists in foreign policy who will exploit the B-52 crash, as well as the rising fear among Danes of US policies in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Far East, to try to reduce Denmark's ties to the US and NATO and to put it on a more neutralist path. These Radical Liberals will be supported by the parliamentary delegations of the far left Venstresocialister Party (VS) and the Socialist People's Party (SPP) and by some of the left-wing Social Democratic deputies. This combination of these Radical Liberals, VS, SPP, and left-wing social Democrats could not effect any basic changes in Denmark's foreign and defense policies because the great majority of the Parliament agrees on their continuation. Yet, the key parliamentary position of the Radical Liberals makes it likely that they will feel that they can force the government to request explicit US assurances that nuclear-armed planes will not overfly Greenland, to cut defense spending, and to call a referendum on continued Danish membership in NATO after 1969.

Icelanders Also Asking Questions. Icelanders, who are highly sensitive about Icelandic sovereignty over the Keflavik Base, are also concerned over the B-52 incident. Foreign Minister Jonsson has already felt obliged to state that the US is observing his country's policy, which forbids any nuclear weapons on Icelandic territory. The erroneous impression has spread that there is a formal agreement between Iceland and the US concerning storage of nuclear weapons at the base and flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. If the Danish Government requests explicit assurances regarding the overflight of nuclear-armed planes, popular pressures in Iceland may increase to the point where the government will be forced to seek such a formal agreement with the US. However, US-Icelandic relations have improved so much and the present Independence Party-Social Democratic coalition has been so friendly toward the US and NATO that the US can expect it—and particularly Prime Minister Benediktsson—to do everything possible to contain worries concerning flights of US planes over Iceland.

Norway Least Concerned. Of the three Scandinavian NATO countries, Norway is the least affected by the B-52 incident. However, memories of the 1960 U-2 affair, when suspicions arose that the US was using a Norwegian base at Bodø for activities that Norwegian officials knew nothing about, are still fresh. That episode, and the similarity between the Danish and Norwegian criticisms of US policy in Vietnam, lead us to believe that the Norwegian Government would most likely follow the lead of Denmark if the latter sought formal assurances from the US that no nuclear-arms-bearing flights will be made over its ter-

ritory. However, as in the case of Iceland, the four-party coalition in Norway is basically friendly to the US and can be counted on to try to prevent any serious strain on US-Norwegian relations.

Potential for Strains in Relations. How far the Scandinavian governments that are members of NATO will go in their demands for concrete assurances concerning overflights of nuclear-armed aircraft will depend to a great extent on their impression of US actions and policies concerning this issue. If the Danish Government fails to get such assurances, it and possibly also the Icelandic Government may have great difficulty in withstanding public pressure for forcing renegotiation of current base agreements to have explicit guarantees against such overflights and storage of nuclear weapons written into them. If relations reach this point, Denmark and Iceland might also seek to assume greater control over all US activities at Thule and Keflavik.

7. Telegram From the Embassy in Denmark to the Department of State¹

Copenhagen, February 8, 1968, 1720Z.

3177. Subject: B-52 Crash: Conversation with Amb Ronne.

1. Amb Ronne, who came to small dinner informally at my home last evening, informed me he is working with Under Secretary Fischer preparing instructions to govern him when he returns to Washington. I gathered that the Danes are exploring possibilities and still hope to hit upon a formula for publicly prohibiting nuclear weapons in Greenland or overflights by planes carrying them that U.S. can accept. He emphasized that exchanges of notes or statement by U.S. which would satisfy Danish public opinion had somehow to be devised.

2. He said Danish Govt wanted to avoid renegotiation of Greenland defense treaty. To try to renegotiate it would open up far more serious problems than it would solve. Among other things he said sensitivity of Greenlanders must be borne in mind. Greenland had more autonomy now than when 1951 treaty was negotiated. In any renegotiation Greenlanders would interject themselves strongly and become complicating factor. Amb Ronne observed that in some ways the Green-

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Confidential.

land defense treaty smacked of Danish colonialism—a subject of great sensitivity to both Greenlanders and Danes.

3. Amb. Ronne repeated what he has doubtlessly frequently said in Washington; namely, American policy of not confirming nor denying existence of nuclear weapons on Greenland or of overflights of planes carrying them is unduly rigid and the very arbitrariness of this position is a danger to existing status of American bases in Greenland.

4. Protect source.

White

8. **Action Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Scandinavian Affairs (McKillop) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy)¹**

Washington, February 13, 1968.

SUBJECT

Talking Points—Anticipated Danish Request for Assurances re Nuclear Overflights and Storage in Greenland

Discussion

1. In view of our earlier conversations with the Danes and in view of the resolution passed February 8 by the Danish Parliament (Paragraph 1, attached Talking Points), we expect Ambassador Rønne to seek an appointment in the Department of State in order to request assurances that the US is acting in accord with Danish nuclear policy in Greenland. They will probably request either a public USG statement and/or an exchange of notes between the two governments.

2. We believe that some formal USG assurance is necessary in order to maintain our present defense capability in Greenland. We wish to avoid taking a stance so rigid as to cause the Danes to question the desirability of retaining the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland. The Danes have not raised this point and probably do not now intend to. However, we believe that both State and Defense should keep in mind the fact that the Danes do hold the strongest cards in any bargaining sessions.

¹ Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Top Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Klebenov and cleared by Baker (EUR/RPM), Berlack (L/EUR), and Trippe (G/PM).

3. Danish nuclear policy encompasses one basic ambiguity; i.e., on the one hand they wish to demonstrate that all Danish territory is free of nuclear weapons; on the other hand, they realize that Denmark's security ultimately depends on the US nuclear deterrent.

4. We believe that the attached statement (Talking Point 5) meets this situation. It provides [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] and allows the GOD to make a policy decision, in time of grave danger, to allow nuclear deployment and/or overflights.

5. Both we and the Danes realize that a situation might conceivably arise where there would be no time for consultations before initiating overflights or deployment. We believe that this contingency can best be handled by an oral statement such as the Undersecretary made to Ambassador Rønne on February 2.² (At that time the Undersecretary said that it was difficult to conceive circumstances where we would initiate nuclear storage or overflights in Greenland without consulting the GOD unless conditions were so extreme that reasons for such actions would be readily apparent.)

6. We hope to have an agreed State-Defense position prior to our discussions with Rønne. We would like to tell DOD that the attached talking points reflect a bureau level decision on this matter.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached talking points as the EUR position on the questions of nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland.³

Attachment

TALKING POINTS

Danish Request for Assurances re Nuclear Overflights and Storage in Greenland

1. The Danish Parliament on February 8 passed a nearly unanimous resolution stating that, "Inasmuch as Parliament presumes that the Government, in attempting to obtain absolute guarantees that no

² Rønne's meeting with Katzenbach on February 2 was reported in telegram 109698 to Copenhagen, February 3. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1)

³ There is no indication whether Leddy approved or disapproved the recommendation.

nuclear weapons are stored in Greenland and that Greenland air space is maintained as a zone free of atomic weapons, will make certain that Danish atomic policy will be maintained in all parts of the realm and Danish sovereignty will be respected, the house continues its debate on the proposed budget bill for the fiscal year 1968-69."

2. The USG is prepared to give the Danish Government assurance on a confidential basis that we will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons except as a result of a joint Danish-US decision that such storage or overflights were necessitated by a threat to Free World security.

3. As Undersecretary Katzenbach indicated it must be recognized that in circumstances of extreme emergency the situation may not permit advance consultation.

4. In our view such a statement would meet the current needs of the Danish Government and preclude a stronger stand on their part that could call into question the entire 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland.

5. Under the circumstances, we would suggest that the Danish Government might wish to make a statement along the following lines:

"On the basis of recent discussions with the USG, the Government is satisfied that United States activities in Greenland are and will continue to be in accord with Danish nuclear policies."

6. As the Ambassador is aware the USG cannot publicly confirm any statement on the deployment of its nuclear weapons which may be made by the Danish Government, nor can it agree to make public any assurance it has given to the Danish Government.

9. **Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹**

Washington, February 23, 1968.

SUBJECT

Background on B-52 Crash near Thule Air Force Base, Greenland

The following summary on aspects of the B-52 crash not directly related to the politico-military problem is presented for your information.

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Confidential. Drafted by Tucker (EUR/SCAN) and cleared by Fulton (G/PM).

Public Opinion—Public attitudes have not been a significant problem thus far. Excellent cooperation among Danish and American officials began at Thule AFB and is continuing. As a result, official statements by the Danes, and a joint statement at the end of the US/Danish scientific meetings on February 15–16 in Copenhagen² have been very favorable to US interests. Emphasis on US/Danish cooperation and negation of the hazards to life in Northwest Greenland seem to have helped to minimize public reaction to the crash.

Contamination—The plutonium contamination in the area does not present a serious problem unless ingested or inhaled in large quantities. None of those working at the site have encountered serious contamination. The alpha particles do not penetrate through the skin, and no significant amount has been detected in the air.

The contamination has been relatively fixed in the ice and snow in the immediate area of the crash. A “gentlemen’s agreement” concluded on February 16 in Copenhagen provides that we will undertake to remove about 50 percent of the contaminated ice and snow.³ This is a massive undertaking, but we believe that General Hunziker can do the job.

Impact on Local Population—We do not yet know how many of the approximately 650 people in the Thule District were affected by the crash. They hunt seal, walrus, and small whale for a livelihood. The area of the crash, one of the best hunting grounds, is now a restricted zone. We expect that compensatory claims will be made, but the Danish Government has not yet done so.

Fisheries—Greenland’s economy is heavily dependent upon its fisheries (exports \$9 million in 1965). The fisheries are located some 500 miles to the South of the crash area and should not be affected by contamination. Nevertheless, adverse psychological consumer reaction could become a problem.

Nuclear and Ecological Studies—Joint US/Danish scientific studies are underway and will be carried out at Thule for some time. We believe that this effort will help to reassure international opinion through careful precautionary monitoring. We anticipate that the results will confirm earlier conclusions that no real hazards exist. Nevertheless, we cannot discount the very minor possibility of isolated incidents of exposure to heavy contamination.

² The scientists from Denmark and the United States met to discuss the issue of radioactive debris in the vicinity of the crash and, in their joint statement, “agreed that under present conditions the radioactivity spread in the area is not a hazard to people or biological species, nor is any hazard foreseen for the future.” (Telegram 3332 from Copenhagen, February 16; *ibid.*)

³ The agreement was transmitted in telegram 3346 from Copenhagen, February 16. (*Ibid.*)

10. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy)¹

Washington, February 24, 1968.

Dear John:

Regarding the Department of State's draft of February 16 on the question of US-Danish nuclear weapons policies,² I would like to propose the attached preliminary revision as a basis for a joint State-Defense position.

I understand that your staff has assured mine that the final US position will not be communicated to the Danish Government until there has been full review in both our Departments of the Danish position.

Sincerely,

Paul C. Warnke

Attachment³

The following is a draft of an Aide-Mémoire (or Note, PM etc., depending upon the form in which the Danish Ambassador presents the Danish position to the Secretary), in response to the anticipated Danish request for an exchange of notes on nuclear weapons in and over Denmark and its territories.

1. The United States Government is prepared to give the Danish Government assurance on a confidential basis that we will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland except with Danish approval.

2. The United States Government is also prepared to give the Danish Government assurance on a confidential basis that we will not overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons except in consultation with the Danish Government. It must be recognized, however, that in circumstances of extreme emergency the situation may make advance consultation difficult.

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 12 US. Secret.

² The February 16 draft, a copy of which is in the Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos, was based closely on the talking points forwarded to Leddy by McKillop on February 13 (attachment to Document 8).

³ Secret; Exdis.

3. Fundamental security considerations prohibit the USG from publicly commenting in any way on the deployment or movement of its nuclear weapons.

4. The United States Government recognizes that the Danish Government desires that a public statement be made on the immediate question of the B-52 crash in Greenland. The USG suggests that if the Danish Government feels it must make a statement, it might be along the following lines:

"The Government is satisfied that United States activities in Greenland are and will continue to be in accord with Danish nuclear policies."

The USG could, of course, in no way confirm or comment on any such statement issued by the Danish Government.

11. Note From the Danish Ambassador (Rønne) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

No. 93.USA.8

Washington, February 26, 1968.

Sir:

1. With reference to our recent discussions regarding defense arrangements in Greenland, I have the honor to inform you that the Danish Government has considered the lack of consistency between the declared Danish policy on nuclear weapons on the one hand and the agreement of April 27, 1951, between our two governments concerning the defense of Greenland on the other.

2. The Danish Government appreciates the assurances recently given by the United States Government that there are no nuclear weapons in Greenland and that no overflights with such weapons are taking place. My Government has also noted with satisfaction the undertaking given by your Government that this situation will not be changed without prior consultation with the Danish Government.

¹Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. No classification marking. Rønne presented the note to Rusk during a 15-minute meeting with Rusk, Leddy, and McKillop that began at 4:05 p.m. on February 26. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) A memorandum of Rønne's conversation with Rusk was transmitted to Copenhagen in telegram 120936, February 27. (Ibid., National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1)

3. The declaration made by the Danish Government at the opening session of the Danish Parliament on February 6, 1968, included the following section:

"It is the policy of the Government that no nuclear weapons should be found within Danish territory. This policy is also valid for Greenland and for Greenland air space."

4. On February 8 the Danish Parliament passed a resolution to the same effect and requesting the Government to get absolute guarantees that no nuclear weapons are stored in Greenland and that Greenland air space is kept free of such weapons so as to ensure that Danish nuclear policy is maintained in all parts of the realm.

5. I am instructed to ask the U.S. Government that discussions be initiated with a view to reaching agreement as soon as possible between our two governments on supplementing the agreement of April 27, 1951, concerning the defense of Greenland to the effect that no nuclear weapons may under the agreement be stored in or introduced into Greenland including Greenland air space.

Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.²

Torben Rønne

² In a March 13 note to Rønne, Rusk acknowledged receipt of the February 27 note and stated that the U.S. Government was "prepared to join in the discussions you have proposed" and would "convey its views to you as soon as possible." (Ibid.)

12. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke)¹

Washington, March 11, 1968.

Dear Paul:

Your letter of February 24 and the Danish note to the Secretary² arrived here within a few hours of one another.

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Secret. Drafted on March 5 by Klebenov and cleared by McKillop, Getz (EUR/RPM), Trippe (G/PM), and Berlack (L/EUR).

² Documents 10 and 11.

We have now prepared a response that reflects the note itself as well as your suggestions of February 24. I have enclosed a copy of our proposed reply,³ as well as of our negotiating points for the anticipated negotiations.⁴

Since the Danes did not, in their note, request a USG public statement, but rather, chose to raise that matter orally, we do not plan to address this question in the note itself but as a separate but related issue.

Our first paragraph calls for a joint decision of the two Governments for both storage and overflights, rather than only storage, as you had proposed. The reasons for this change are: (a) The Danes have specifically asked for equal assurance on both points, and (b) we feel that the second paragraph of our reply provides the US with the flexibility necessary in the event of future emergencies.

The first paragraph of our response also takes into account Denmark's desire to supplement the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland. We see no objection to doing this in a classified note inasmuch as the practical effect of the assurances we propose will in fact be to modify rights which the Danes agree were accorded us by the 1951 Agreement.

Our statement on crisis consultation in regard to overflights is designed to place on record, as you do, the idea that conditions may make such consultation difficult.

I agree with your method of stating the need to avoid public comment on nuclear weapons deployment. We do, however, feel that we should, in such a statement, cite our mutual responsibilities to all of the Alliance members.

In regard to the public statement to be made by the Danes, we believe that the phrase "On the basis of recent discussions with the United States Government . . ." is necessary. Since we propose to tell the Danes that we will not publicly confirm their statement, we feel that we cannot expect them to limit a unilateral Danish Government statement in the way that you suggest. Indeed, there is little to prevent the Danes from issuing a much stronger unilateral statement than the one we propose. While it is true that the Danish Government made a statement on January 29 that did not cite discussions with the US Government,⁵ they were far from satisfied with that arrangement. We believe that if we had not been dealing with a recently defeated, caretaker Government, we would have encountered strong, continuous pressure for US confirmation of the Danish announcement. We consider a statement

³ Not attached, but see the attachment to Document 10.

⁴ Not attached.

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 5.

along the lines of that given in our negotiating points to be the minimum that the new Government could accept, especially in view of its publicly stated intention of seeking US agreement on nuclear matters.

In sum, we hope to work out with the Danes some sort of agreement and accompanying public statement that will remove this question from the public arena and that will insure our continued access to Greenland as a radar site and as an air route and/or deployment site in future emergencies. I believe that our proposed draft will accomplish this. I look forward to receiving your views as a matter of urgency.

Sincerely yours,

John M. Leddy⁶

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

13. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark¹

Washington, March 13, 1968, 2339Z.

128993. Subj: Greenland.

1. Ambassador Rønne, at his request, called on Assistant Secretary Leddy at 5:00 pm March 8. He was accompanied by Fergo. Ambassador said he was leaving March 11 for lecture tour of 16 to 18 days duration. He asked if there had been any developments in regard to Danish note of February 26.² Mr. Leddy replied that we were working with DOD and hoped to have a reply soon. At Ambassador's request, Mr. Leddy agreed to April 1 meeting with Ambassador.

2. Ambassador Rønne asked if we had any preference for manner of implementing proposed supplement to 1951 Agreement on Defense of Greenland. Mr. Leddy said that our preference would be for a confidential exchange of notes. We had not been thinking in terms of a formal agreement that would legally preclude nuclear storage and/or overflights (as distinct from undertakings providing for consultation) and we could not, of course, publish any agreement on this matter.

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 GREENLAND-US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Klebenov on March 12, cleared by Toon in substance, and approved by Leddy. Pouched to Moscow.

² Document 11.

3. At this point the Ambassador presented the following two alternative drafts for a "Danish/American Agreement about nuclear policy in Greenland."

"Alternative 1. Activities under present agreement shall not include the storing in and introduction into Greenland territory including Greenland air space of nuclear weapons.

Alternative 2. Under the present agreement no nuclear weapons may be stored in or introduced into Greenland territory including Greenland air space."

4. Mr. Leddy again raised doubts about the wisdom of a formal amendment to the agreement that would legally and permanently preclude nuclear weapons in or overflights of Greenland.

5. Ambassador then raised question of public statement. He said public USG confirmation of absence nuclear weapons in and over Greenland necessary due to pressures in Parliament. He said that he saw USG statement as way to put an end to public and parliamentary discussion of matter. He added that such discussion could only raise new problems in regard to Greenland. He said that he understood our policy considerations but pointed out that Denmark, out of loyalty to US had gone against its own standing policy during recent Chicom representation problem in UN Security Council.

6. Mr. Leddy pointed out necessity of USG adhering to no comment practice re nuclear deployment and overflights. He said that departure from this practice would jeopardize US nuclear deterrent; that this was a security question that involves all of us. Mr. Leddy pointed out that issue was wider than Danish US question; that if we made exception for Danes we would then have this exception cited to-us by every country with a current or future nuclear question. Mr. Leddy also asked why, if Danish Government said categorically that there was no nuclear storage in or overflights of Greenland, the Danish people would not believe their own Government. He also asked if Soviets were providing Denmark with assurances they were not overflying Danish territory with nuclear weapons (at this point Fergo pointed out that Danes never knew if Soviet ships transiting Danish home waters did or did not carry nukes). Ambassador said, with no great conviction, that Soviets had stated they did not operate nuclear overflights.

7. Mr. Leddy concluded Greenland discussion by stating that we were conscious of the extent of the problem and that we hoped, on the Ambassador's return, to have something to put on table and discuss.

8. Rønne then remarked that he had recently met Dobrynin at social function and that latter had asked if Rønne had seen recent newspaper articles on US overflight suspension and asked if the Danes had seen any confirmation of this decision. Ambassador Rønne had replied

that he was only concerned with overflights of Danish territory, concerning which he had no misgivings on US policy.

9. Rønne then asked if we intended to reply to Soviet Aide-Mémoire of February 10.³ Mr. Leddy said he felt that we probably should reply, that a reply was in preparation, but that we were in no hurry. He pointed out, however, that in the context of US-Soviet relations, it was not unheard of to let such a message go unanswered. (On leaving the building, Fergo expressed to SCAN officer the hope that Danes would be consulted in advance of any reply to the Soviet Aide-Mémoire.)⁴

Rusk

³ The aide-mémoire was transmitted in telegram 113631 to Moscow, February 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US)

⁴ In telegram 131152 to Moscow and Copenhagen, March 15, the Department transmitted the text of a proposed reply to the Soviet aide-mémoire but specified that the Danes not be consulted. The text of the Department's March 21 reply to the Soviets was transmitted to Moscow and Copenhagen in airgram CA-6730. The text of a second Soviet aide-mémoire on the B-52 crash, dated April 9, was transmitted to Moscow and Copenhagen in airgram CA-7282, April 15, together with a covering note stating that the Department saw nothing to be gained by replying and did not plan to do so unless the Soviets publicized their aide-mémoire. Telegrams 113631 and 131152 and airgrams CA-6730 and CA 7282 are *ibid*.

14. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)¹

Washington, March 28, 1968.

SUBJECT

Agreement with the Government of Denmark on Nuclear Overflights and Storage in Greenland

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov on March 27 and cleared by Farley (G/PM) and Berlack (L/EUR). The memorandum was addressed to "The Secretary" when it was typed, but "Under" was then inserted by hand (presumably by Leddy) between "The" and "Secretary."

Discussion:

In your reply (Tab B) to the Danish note of February 26 (Tab C)² you stated that the United States Government was prepared to discuss with the Danes the matter of supplementing the Agreement of April 27, 1951 concerning the Defense of Greenland.

We have, subsequently, told the Danish Ambassador that our preference was for a secret exchange of notes that would make nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland subject to consultation between our two Governments. The Danes have indicated that they are willing to accept this procedure.

We have drawn up a draft note (Tab A) which has been approved by the Department of Defense. I propose to present this draft to the Danish Ambassador when he calls on me on Monday April 1.

Our draft is designed to:

- (a) assure the Danes that we are not now overflying Greenland with nuclear weapons or storing such weapons in Greenland;
- (b) allow for nuclear overflights or storage in the future if both Governments deem such action advisable; and
- (c) point out to the Danes that there may be conditions of extreme emergency under which consultations with respect to overflights would be difficult.

If you concur, I plan to give a draft copy of our note to the Danish Ambassador on April 1 and tell him that we would be prepared to present that text as a secret note in reply to their note of February 26.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached draft note.³

Attachment

PROPOSED RESPONSE TO CONFIDENTIAL DANISH NOTE OF
FEBRUARY 26

The United States Government assures the Government of Denmark that, notwithstanding the provisions of the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland, it will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons except as a result of a joint decision by our two Governments.

² See Document 11 and footnote 2 thereto.

³ Katzenbach indicated his approval on March 31.

It must be recognized however, that in circumstances of extreme emergency, the situation may make advance consultation with respect to overflights difficult. The United States Government would, nonetheless, make every effort to consult the Government of Denmark in such circumstances.

15. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark¹

Washington, April 3, 1968, 1724Z.

140926. Subject: Greenland.

1. At April 1 meeting with Rønne and Fergo, Leddy presented draft of proposed US note² (text pouched March 20 under cover McKillop-Blankinship letter). Leddy stated that USG was prepared to use text as secret note in response to Danish note of February 26.

2. Rønne said first paragraph, calling for joint decision, presented no problem. He questioned both need and feasibility for including second paragraph (which states that consultation may be difficult under emergency conditions). Both Rønne and Fergo felt that the Foreign Office would object to the language of the second paragraph. They suggested omitting the second paragraph on the ground that the situation it addresses does not appear to need any spelling out in advance.

3. Mr. Leddy pointed out that, following the Thule crash, a lack of awareness of certain agreements on the part of high Danish Government officials had caused a delay of a full week in clarifying the situation between our two Governments. He proposed however, that Dept consult with Defense again on point Rønne raised and that meanwhile Rønne not transmit text to his Foreign Office. Ambassador agreed readily and pointed out present text, if sent to Foreign Office, could create negative reaction unhelpful to our discussions.

4. In regard to Rønne's question about public statement, Leddy suggested that, for present, Government, if asked in Parliament, state that discussions with USG on matter are continuing.

Katzenbach

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 GREENLAND-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Klebenov, cleared by McKillop, and approved by Leddy.

² Attachment to Document 14.

16. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke)¹

Washington, April 17, 1968.

Dear Paul:

As you know from our reporting cable,² Ambassador Rønne told us on April 1 that the second paragraph, the "escape clause" of our proposed note,³ would be unacceptable to the Danish Government.

In his discussion with me, Ambassador Rønne indicated that he understood the problem that we were addressing in Paragraph 2 of our draft but stated that this situation need not be spelled out in advance. The implication of what Rønne said is that in a serious crisis it goes without saying that military requirements would be overriding. While a written escape clause might nevertheless be helpful in justifying an overflight of Greenland in an instance where time did not allow us to obtain the agreement of the Danish Government, I do not believe that the lack of such a written understanding would critically limit our freedom of action in circumstances of a grave and sudden threat. Therefore, I propose that we offer the Danes only the first paragraph in reply to their note of February 26.⁴

I shall, on presenting our reply, reiterate the possible requirement for U.S. overflights under the circumstances described above: i.e., those where a grave and sudden threat does not allow time to obtain the agreement of the Danish Government.

This solution of course, will not involve an outright prohibition of nuclear weapons flights over Greenland, as the Danes proposed in their February 26 note. Further, it should serve to prevent this issue from jeopardizing the 1951 Greenland Defense Agreement under which we operate electronic surveillance systems in that territory and maintain the air base at Thule.

I would appreciate your comments at an early date.

Sincerely,

John M. Leddy⁵

¹ Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Secret. Drafted by Trippe and Klebenov and cleared in L, G, and EUR.

² Document 15.

³ Attachment to Document 14.

⁴ Document 11.

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

17. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Warnke) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy)¹

Washington, April 26, 1968.

Dear John:

This is in reply to your letter of April 17, 1968,² in which you propose a compromise classified reply to the Danish note of February 26 on nuclear storage in and overflights of Greenland.³ We concur in your proposed reply if, as you suggest in your letter, you reiterate to the Danish Ambassador the possible requirement for US overflights with nuclear weapons in a serious crisis without advance notification or approval, and if you furnish him a memorandum of your conversation with him to this effect, which would serve as a record that this important point had been discussed with him. We hope that, in accordance with your own expressed expectation, this compromise reply will serve to prevent this nuclear weapons issue from jeopardizing the important 1951 Defense of Greenland Agreement.

You make no mention in your April 17 letter of the earlier Danish request for the United States Government's association with a public statement on the subject of nuclear overflights of or storage of nuclear weapons in Greenland. Our position continues to be that no such statement should be made, that we hope the Danes will make no such statement, and that we could not confirm any such statement if they do choose to make one.

Sincerely,

Paul C. Warnke

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17-1 US. Secret.

² Document 16.

³ Document 11.

18. **Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹**

Washington, May 9, 1968.

SUBJECT

Agreement with the Government of Denmark on Nuclear Overflights and Storage in Greenland

Discussion:

In your reply (Tab C) to the Danish note of February 26 (Tab D)² you stated that the United States Government was prepared to discuss with the Danes the matter of supplementing the Agreement of April 27, 1951 concerning the Defense of Greenland.

The Danish Ambassador has tentatively agreed that any such supplement should take the form of a secret exchange of notes. He has also agreed that future nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland should be subject to consultation between our two Governments. The latter provision is in contrast to the Danish request, stated in their February 26 note, for an unconditional ban on nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland.

On March 31 the Under Secretary authorized me to offer the Danish Ambassador a draft text (Tab B)³ for the consideration of his Government. The Ambassador, on April 1, read our draft and indicated that the first paragraph, which makes nuclear overflights and storage subject to consultation, would be acceptable to his Government. He felt, however, that the Danish Foreign Ministry would object to the second paragraph, in which we pointed out that there may be conditions of extreme emergency under which consultation with respect to overflights would be difficult. He suggested omitting the second paragraph since the situation it addresses does not need spelling out in advance.

After further consultation with the Department of Defense we are now prepared to offer the Danes, as a draft text, the first paragraph only of our April 1 text (Tab A),⁴ accompanied by an oral notation on my part, pointing out that there could be a requirement for U.S. overflights under conditions of a grave and sudden threat that did not allow time to obtain the agreement of the Danish Government.

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov on May 7 and cleared by Trippe (G/PM), Belman (L), and Berlack (L/EUR).

² See Document 11 and footnote 2 thereto.

³ Attachment to Document 14.

⁴ Printed below.

If you concur, I plan to give a draft copy of our note to the Danish Ambassador this week, and tell him that we would be prepared to use that text in a secret exchange of notes supplementing the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland. I would, at that time, point out again the possible need for U.S. overflights without consultation, under the conditions described above.

Recommendation:

That you approve the attached draft note (Tab A).⁵

Attachment

Draft Note to be Presented to Ambassador Rønne
for Consideration by Government of Denmark

The United States Government assures the Government of Denmark that, notwithstanding the provisions of the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland, it will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons except as a result of a joint decision by our two Governments.

⁵ Rusk indicated his approval on May 10.

19. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark¹

Washington, May 13, 1968, 1709Z.

162867. Subject: Greenland—Nuclear Overflights and Storage.

1. Ambassador Rønne, accompanied by Counselor Per Fergo, met with Assistant Secretary Leddy on May 10 to consider US response to Danish note of February 26.

¹ Source: Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15-4 GREENLAND-US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Klebenov on May 11, cleared by McKillop, and approved by Leddy.

2. Leddy referred to Rønne's April 1 comments on text proposed that date² (as pouched March 20 under cover McKillop/Blankinship letter); recalled that Rønne had said first paragraph presented no problems for Danes but had suggested omission of second paragraph on basis that situation it addresses did not need spelling out in advance.

3. Leddy gave Rønne draft text consisting of first paragraph only of April 1 text. He said that if Danish Fonoff approves text, USG prepared to incorporate same in formal exchange of notes in near future.

4. Leddy said that at time of exchange of notes he would reiterate possible requirement for US overflights under circumstances of a grave and sudden threat that does not allow time to obtain agreement of Danish Government. Leddy said that the USG will retain record of this statement.

5. Rønne asked if he would be obliged to report Leddy's oral statement to his Government. Leddy replied that was Rønne's decision. Rønne said that oral statement appeared to make the proposed agreement less than binding. Leddy pointed out that the written agreement would be governing instrument; that, as in case of any US agreement, we would abide by it to full extent of our ability to do so; but that circumstances beyond our control could make overflights without consultation necessary. He pointed out that we are not asking Danes to give written permission for such overflights, but that we must make clear the possible need for same in event of a grave and sudden threat that would not allow time for consultations.

6. Rønne asked why new draft was classified secret rather than confidential, as in the case of Danish February 26 note and US reply to that note. It was pointed out that Danish note had been request to initiate discussions on supplementing 1951 agreement in regard to nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland and that US in reply had agreed to enter into such discussions. Text under consideration was different matter since it embodied a specific limitation on deployment and movement of US nuclear weapons; hence must be secret.

7. In reply to Ambassador's question on public statement, Leddy said that we should first give Danish Government chance to consider text. He stressed that in any case, we cannot confirm or deny any statement concerning deployment or movement of nuclear weapons.

8. Rønne said pressure from press remained heavy and that Danish Government must be able to issue statement referring to negotiations and US agreement to exclude nuclear weapons from Greenland.

9. In reply Leddy said again that we will not join Danes in such a statement; nor could we confirm any statement on the negotiations. He said that Danish Government can say that there were no nuclear

² See Document 15.

weapons in or over Greenland and that there would not be any without the Danish Government's approval. The Danish Government, he said, is free to give its people full assurances on any aspect of this question. We cannot, however, fracture our global policy on the US nuclear deterrent by publicly confirming such a statement. He added that no such USG participation should be required to validate statement by Danish Government to its own people.

10. At this point Rønne offered text, apparently for public statement, but which Leddy did not accept. Leddy noted it would amount to formal amendment to 1951 Agreement placing absolute ban on nuclear weapons in Greenland thus making it too inflexible. He pointed out that US proposal gave Danes the requested assurances on nuclear weapons but allowed both parties to act quickly if circumstances required nuclear overflights.

11. Rønne persisted in reiterating need for Danish public reference to negotiations, adding that if we cannot reach agreement here, it would be necessary to consult in Copenhagen under Article XIII (3) of the 1951 Agreement. In reply to repeated statements on need for public statement, Leddy again said that Danish Government free to say publicly that it is fully satisfied with current arrangements re Greenland nuclear matters. He pointed out that Danes do not, in practice, publish all of their international agreements and that no other nuclear power has given the sort of public assurances that Rønne was asking for. He again urged Danish Government to consider alternatives to their proposed method of assuring their public.

12. On leaving, Rønne said that US draft note appears acceptable but that need remained for public statement.

Rusk

20. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Denmark¹**

Washington, May 18, 1968, 0235Z.

166783. Subj: Greenland—Nuclear Overflights and Storage. Ref: State 162867.²

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 17 US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Klebenov on May 17, cleared by McKillop and in substance by Berlack (L/EUR), and approved by Leddy.

² Document 19.

1. Ambassador Rønne, accompanied by Counselor Fergo, called on Assistant Secretary Leddy May 16. Rønne said he had just received reply from Fonoff on text and discussion of May 10 meeting.³

2. Rønne said Fonoff had noted the oral statement Leddy made May 10 re flight requirements in case of grave and sudden threat (para 4 State 162867).

3. Rønne repeated statement of May 10 that due to parliamentary and press pressures Danish Government will need to make a public statement. However, he said his Government accepts USG policy of not confirming or denying statements of this kind; that Danes would not request USG confirmation or mutual statement, but would rather issue unilateral one.

4. Rønne also confirmed Danish Government would treat exchange of notes as secret.

5. Rønne then presented following revised text prepared by Danish Fonoff: "The United States Government assures the Government of Denmark that in the exercise of its rights and duties in accordance with the provisions of the agreement of April 27, 1951 concerning the defense of Greenland it will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.

This note and your reply shall constitute an agreement between our two governments and shall be considered an integral part of the defense agreement."

Rønne described Danish proposal as being minor changes in text and procedures of final exchange of notes.

6. Leddy said that Danish proposal would amount to an amendment of treaty that would prohibit absolutely nuclear overflights and storage. It made no provision, he noted, for a joint decision to institute nuclear overflights or storage.

7. Rønne said that article XIII (3) allowed for such a decision. Leddy pointed out that that article merely allows both sides to amend treaty by mutual agreement. Our aim, he said, was an agreement that provided flexibility by allowing nuclear overflights quickly, if both sides agree. Leddy pointed out that our May 10 text⁴ had left full control on overflights and storage with GOD. He asked Rønne what problem was with wording that did not allow nuclear overflights or storage without consent GOD. Rønne did not defend this aspect Fonoff text, stating only Fonoff evidently did not feel reference to joint decision was needed; that article XIII (3) covered such a possibility. He added he had received text only two hours previously and so had no chance to discuss with Fonoff its rationale on this point.

³ Summarized in telegram 162867.

⁴ Attachment to Document 18.

8. Leddy said that he saw no problem in replacing phrase "Notwithstanding the provisions of the 1951 Agreement on the Defense of Greenland" with wording "in the exercise of its rights and duties in accordance with the provisions of the agreement of April 27, 1951 concerning the Defense of Greenland."

9. Leddy said that first para could be made acceptable by adding to last sentence words "without the consent of the Government of Denmark." He did not see this as substantive change from US reference to a joint decision and would so inform DOD.

10. Re final phrase "shall be considered an integral part of the defense agreement" Leddy said there may be technical problems and he would have to consult Legal Advisor. He noted in this respect that 1951 agreement was subject to approval of Danish Parliament although as an executive agreement it was not subject to US Senate approval.

11. Ambassador Rønne said he would report quickly to his government which is under pressure to settle problem soonest. Leddy agreed to desirability of moving fast. He saw no reason for delay in exchange of notes if GOD could agree to his suggested change in para 1 and if second half of last para posed no problem to Legal Advisor.

12. Leddy said that in regard to oral statement (see para 2) we consider it as having been made. Rønne concurred.

13. At noon May 17, Rønne informed us by telephone that Danish Foreign Office had agreed to addition of phrase "without the consent of the Government of Denmark."

Rusk

21. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Leddy) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)¹

Washington, May 29, 1968.

SUBJECT

Negotiations with Denmark on Nuclear Overflights and Storage in Greenland

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US. Secret. Drafted by Klebenov.

Danish Request

The Government of Denmark, shortly after the January 21, 1968 crash of a nuclear armed USAF B-52, requested an absolute ban on nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland. Ambassador Rønne requested such a ban in his discussions with me and in his February 26 note to the Secretary.

At that same time, the Danes made repeated requests for U.S. participation in, or endorsement of, a Danish Government announcement that would indicate that Greenland was, in effect, a nuclear free zone. We could not accede to the latter request, although did in confidence give oral assurances to the Danes that we were not overflying Greenland with nuclear weapons.

U.S. Objectives

In our negotiations we sought:

- a) to retain the right to conduct such nuclear overflights of Greenland as might be required by security;
- b) to avoid subjecting the entire 1951 Agreement to review and possible modification under terms of Article XIII (3). (It should be noted in this context, that we sought both to retain overflight rights, as noted above, and to maintain our access to Greenland as an important base for electronic surveillance, i.e., BMEWS (ballistic missile early warning system) installations);
- c) to avoid as far as possible, public discussion of the deployment and movement of U.S. nuclear weapons.

Effect of the Proposed Settlement

We have, after lengthy negotiations with the Danes, reached agreement in principle on the issues noted above. The proposed secret exchange of notes² accomplishes the following:

- a) We retain the right to nuclear overflights and storage in Greenland, subject to the agreement of both Governments that such actions are necessary;

² Rusk approved of the proposed U.S. note and Danish reply (see Document 22) in response to a May 23 action memorandum from Leddy that reviewed the negotiations and recommended approval. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1) President Johnson gave his approval of the U.S. note at a May 29 luncheon meeting with his senior foreign policy advisers. (Record of decisions, May 29; *ibid.*, Files of Walt W. Rostow, Meetings with the President, May-June 1968) No record of the luncheon discussion has been found. On May 27 Rostow had forwarded the text of the note to the President under cover of a memorandum that highlighted the negotiations and emphasized that "we will have the right to overfly or store nuclear weapons in Greenland subject to Danish approval (unilaterally in case of emergency); and we will avoid a full scale renegotiation of the 1951 agreement." (*Ibid.*, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1)

b) The Danes are on notice that the U.S. may conduct nuclear overflights under circumstances of a grave and sudden threat that does not allow us time to consult the Danish Government. (The Danish Foreign Office has formally noted my May 10 oral statement³ of this possible need);

c) We avoid reopening the 1951 Agreement for renegotiation, thus avoiding any new provisions that might hinder our activities in Greenland including the operation of the Thule Air Base and the maintenance of an extremely important segment of the BMEWS;

d) In conjunction with the proposed settlement the Danish Government agreed to drop its request for any U.S. participation in or endorsement of a public statement concerning nuclear weapons in Greenland.

Timing of Agreement

The Danish Government is extremely anxious to effect the proposed exchange of notes prior to the June 5 visit of Foreign Minister Hartling.

³ See Document 19.

22. Note From the Danish Ambassador (Rønne) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

No. 93.USA.9

Washington, May 31, 1968.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to your note of this date on the subject of an agreement between Denmark and the U.S. on storage of U.S. nuclear weapons in Greenland and the overflight of Greenland by U.S. aircraft carrying nuclear weapons which reads in its entirety as follows:

"Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to the recent discussions between our two Governments regarding the request of your Government, made on February 26, 1968, that the U.S. and Denmark agree to supplement the Agreement of April 27, 1951 on the Defense of Greenland with respect to the storage of U.S. nuclear weapons in Greenland and the overflight of Greenland by U.S. aircraft carrying nuclear weapons.

¹ Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Secret. Leddy and Rønne exchanged notes at a meeting on May 31. Leddy reported to Copenhagen on the meeting in telegram 174887, June 1. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Denmark, Vol. 1)

As a result of these discussions, I have the honor to propose the following Agreement:

The United States Government assures the Government of Denmark that in the exercise of its rights and duties in accordance with the provisions of the agreement of April 27, 1951, concerning the defense of Greenland it will not store nuclear weapons in Greenland or overfly Greenland with aircraft carrying nuclear weapons without the consent of the Government of Denmark.

If the foregoing proposal is acceptable to your Government, I have the honor to propose that this note and your reply to that effect shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments, effective on the date of your reply, which shall form an integral part of the Agreement of April 27, 1951.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration."

I have the honor to state that the proposal contained in your note is acceptable to my Government and that our two notes shall constitute an agreement, effective today, which shall form an integral part of the Agreement of April 27, 1951 on the Defense of Greenland.

Please accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Torben Rønne

23. Editorial Note

On May 31, 1968, the Danish Ministry for Foreign Affairs released the following statement: "As a result of the plane crash at Thule, the Government instructed its Ambassador in Washington to raise with the American Government the question of assurances that Danish atomic policy as specified in the Folketing Resolution of February 8, 1968 is upheld in Greenland. In the discussions the Ambassador has confirmed Danish atomic policy as expressed in the Folketing Resolution, in accordance with which nuclear arms may not be stocked in Greenland and the Greenland air territory may not be overflown with such weapons. As previously reported, nuclear arms are not stocked in Greenland and overflights with such weapons do not take place. The result of the discussions in Washington creates harmony between the Defense Agreement of 1951 and Danish atomic policy and therewith assurance under international law, that this policy is respected in Greenland." (Telegram 5076 from Copenhagen, June 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 GREENLAND-US) For the text of the Folketing Resolution of February 8, see the attachment to Document 8.

Prior to release of the statement, Ambassador Rønne told an officer of the Bureau of European Affairs that he believed that the U.S. Government would find the statement acceptable and that U.S. Government interests, as expressed during the recent negotiations, had been taken into account in its preparation. (Telegram 174887 to Copenhagen, June 1; *ibid.*)

24. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 6, 1968, 1 p.m.

SUBJECT

Nuclear Storage, Nuclear Overflights and Chemical and Biological Warfare
Testing in Greenland

PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister of Denmark, Poul Hartling
Permanent Under Secretary, Danish Foreign Office, Paul Fischer
Ambassador of Denmark, Torben Rønne

The Secretary
Under Secretary of the Treasury Frederick Deming
Export-Import Bank Vice Chairman Walter Sauer
USIA Director Leonard Marks
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy Affairs, Carl Walska
Assistant Secretary John M. Leddy
Ambassador William Leonhart
Country Director George Mason Ingram

The Foreign Minister expressed his and his Government's gratification at the exchange of notes precluding the storage of nuclear weapons in Greenland and the overflight of Greenland by planes carrying nuclear weapons without the Danish Government's consent. He welcomed the Secretary's assurance that the US has not conducted chemical/biological warfare tests in Greenland, and thanked him for his assurances that it would not do so in the future as well as for his understanding that any such move would require the consent of the Government of Denmark.

¹ Source: Department of State, Danish Desk Files: Lot 73 D 167, Thule Crash—Internal Memos. Secret. Drafted by Ingram (EUR/SCAN). The memorandum is Part III of IV. Memoranda covering the other portions of the meeting are *ibid.* The conversation was held in the Madison Room at the State Department.

Abbreviations

- ABM, anti-ballistic missiles
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFB, Air Force Base
AID, Agency for International Development
ANF, Atlantic Nuclear Force
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States (security treaty)
ASP, American System of Preferences
ASW, anti-submarine warfare
- BAOR, British Army on the Rhine
BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation
BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
BOE, Bank of England
B/P, balance of payments
BUSEC, series indicator for telegrams to the U.S. Mission to the European Regional Organizations
- CA, Department of State circular airgram
CAP, Common Agricultural Policy (of the European Economic Community)
CAS, Controlled American Source
CBC, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation
CDT, Central Daylight Time
CEA, French atomic energy agency
CENTO, Central Treaty Organization
ChiCom(s), Chinese Communist(s)
ChiRep, Chinese representation question
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, Atlantic
CINCUSAFE, Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force, Europe
COB, close of business
COCOM, Coordinating Committee on Export Controls
CONUS, Continental United States
CSAF, Chief of Staff, Air Force
- DC, Christian Democratic Party (Italy)
Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram
Dept, Department of State
Deptel, Department of State telegram
DM, Deutsche Mark
DMZ, Demilitarized Zone
DOD, Department of Defense
- EC, European Community
ECBUS, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Mission to the European Regional Organizations
EEC, European Economic Community (Common Market)
EFTA, European Free Trade Association

XXII Abbreviations

ELDO, European Launcher Development Organization

Emb, Embassy

Embtel, Embassy telegram

ENI, Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (Italian labor union)

EST, Eastern Standard Time

EUCOM, European Command (U.S. Army)

EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/CAN, Office of Canadian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EURATOM, European Atomic Energy Committee

Exdis, Exclusive Distribution (extremely limited distribution)

EXIM, Export-Import Bank

ExtAff, External Affairs

FAA, Federal Aviation Administration; Foreign Assistance Act

FCN, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (treaties)

FE, Far East

FO, Foreign Office

FonMin, Foreign Minister

FonOff, Foreign Office

FonSec, Foreign Secretary

FRG, Federal Republic of Germany

FY, fiscal year

FYI, for your information

G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

GA, General Assembly (United Nations)

GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GMT, Greenwich Meridian Time (Zebra)

GNP, Gross National Product

GOC, Government of Canada

GOD, Government of Denmark

GOF, Government of France

GOI, Government of Italy

GOP, Government of Portugal

GOS, Government of Spain

G/PM, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs

GVN, Government of Vietnam

HMG, Her Majesty's Government

IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM, inter-continental ballistic missile

ICC, International Control Commission

ICJ, International Court of Justice

IMF, International Monetary Fund

IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (UNESCO)

IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State

IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile

IRG, Interdepartmental Regional Group

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JUSMG, Joint U.S. Military Group

KR, Kennedy Round (GATT)

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
LA, Latin America
LBJ, initials of President Lyndon B. Johnson
LDC, Less Developed Countries
Limdis, Limited Distribution
Loran, Long-Range Navigational Aid

MAP, Military Assistance Program
MinDef, Minister of Defense
MLF, Multilateral Force
MOD, Minister of Defense

NAC, North Atlantic Council (NATO)
NAFTA, North Atlantic Free Trade Area
NAMSO, NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATUS, series indicator for telegrams from the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NLF, National Liberation Front (Vietnam)
Noform, No Foreign Dissemination
NORAD, North American Air Defense Command (Canada-U.S.)
NPT, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
NSC, National Security Council
NVN, North Vietnam

OAS, Organization of American States
OAU, Organization of African Unity
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ORTF, Office de la Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française

PCF, Parti Communist Français (French Communist Party)
PCI, Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party)
PermRep, Permanent Representative (United Nations)
P.L., Public Law
PLI, Liberal Party of Italy
PM, Prime Minister
POL, petroleum, oil, lubricants
PriMin, Prime Minister
PSDI, Democratic Socialist Party (Italy)
PSI, Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party)
PSIUP, Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (Italy).

R&D, research and development

XXIV Abbreviations

RDF, Radio Diffusion Française
refftel, reference telegram
RG, Record Group
RPM, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

S, Office of the Secretary of State
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO)
SACLANT, Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic
SAH, Office of the Ambassador at Large, Department of State
SAM, surface-to-air missiles
SC, Security Council (United Nations)
SDR, Special Drawing Rights (IMF)
SEA, Southeast Asia
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
septel, separate telegram
SETAF, U.S. Army South European Task Force
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
SIFAR, Italian Armed Forces Intelligence Service
SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group
SOFA, Status of Forces Agreement
S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State
SPD, Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands (Socialist Party of Germany)
STR, Office of the Special Trade Representative
SVN, South Vietnam
SYG, Secretary-General (United Nations)

U, Office of the Under Secretary of State
UAM, African and Malagasy Union
UAR, United Arab Republic
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UPI, United Press International
USAFE, United States Air Force, Europe
USCINCEUR, United States Commander in Chief, Europe
USEC, United States Mission to the Economic Community
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIS, United States Information Service
USNAVEUR, United States Naval Forces, Europe
USRO, United States Mission to the European Regional Organizations (in Paris)
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UST, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements
USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations

VC, Viet Cong
Vipto, series indicator for telegrams from the Vice President

WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
WEU, Western European Union